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 Sharia.  Religion scholars may dispute the precise meaning of the 
term, but it invariably provokes immediate and conflicting reactions 
among the American public.  To believers, it is a series of sacred 
precepts ordained by God to help foster a holy life.  To critics, it is an 
oppressive and theocratic menace that must be stopped at all costs.  
But whatever the meaning or merits of sharia as a religious matter, the 
festering controversy over its present consideration by domestic courts 
is not, at bottom, a religious dispute.  Rather, it is a struggle over the 
extent to which Muslims, like people of other faiths in this country, 
should be free to tailor their personal or business affairs according to 
deeply-held beliefs about who they are and where they are going—
even, and especially, where those beliefs are controversial or 
unpopular.  It is about religious liberty. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The particulars of sharia are somewhat amorphous, and can vary 
by sect, nationality, or believer.  Sharia may nonetheless be described 
generally as a “moral, religious, ethical, and legal system based on 
Islam’s two primary sources: the Holy Qu’ran, which Muslims believe 
to be the literal word of God, and the Sunnah, the teachings and 
practices of Prophet Mohammad.”1  In addition to the Koran and 
Prophet, Muslims also draw upon the wisdom of Islamic scholars and 
a form of religious common law based on analogies to Koranic 
principles.2  As one would expect, sharia concerns religious worship 
and ritual.3  It can extend further, however, to also address more 
secular matters like domestic relations, wills and estate planning, 
business transactions, and, perhaps most controversially, crime and 
punishment.4 
American courts do not, and could not, apply the criminal-law 
provisions of sharia.5  They do, however, consider sharia in civil 
disputes—at least indirectly.  Courts, for example, enforce contract 
terms requiring certain disputes be resolved through sharia-based 
arbitration.6  They also address sharia in domestic-relations cases, 
including those arising from relationships among Muslims in this 
country as well as those begun, and perhaps previously adjudged, 
overseas (i.e., in Muslim countries).7  And courts defer to Muslim 
officials when reviewing clerical or other intra-faith disputes.8  In the 
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 1  Muhammad Elsayed, Comment, Contracting Into Religious Law: Anti-Sharia 
Enactments and the Establishment and Free-Exercise Clauses, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 937, 939 
(2013). 
 2  Frank Griffel, Introduction to SHARI’A: ISLAMIC LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY 
CONTEXT 1, 3 (Abbas Amanat & Frank Griffel eds., 2007). 
 3  MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, SHARI’A LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 41 (2008). 
 4  See id. at 41–42. 
 5  See Jeremy Grunert, Note, How Do You Solve a Problem Like Sharia? Awad v. Ziriax 
and the Question of Sharia Law in America, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 695, 725–26 (2013) 
(describing statutory and constitutional limitations on the domestic application of any 
sharia-based criminal-law provisions). 
 6  See, e.g., Abd Alla v. Mourssi, 680 N.W.2d 569, 574 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) 
(affirming Islamic arbitration); Jabri v. Qaddura, 108 S.W.3d 404, 413–14 (Tex. App. 
2003) (same). 
 7  See, e.g., S.B. v. W.A., 959 N.Y.S.2d 802, 819 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012) (upholding 
sharia-based premarital agreement); Hosain v. Malik, 671 A.2d 988, 1010–11 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1996) (enforcing a Pakistani child-custody order).  
 8  See, e.g., El-Farra v. Sayyed, 226 S.W.3d 792, 796 (Ark. 2006) (relying on 
“ministerial exception” in refusing to hear imam’s claims against his former mosque 
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end, the results in these cases might differ from what civil law would 
otherwise require.  For example, courts might impose monetary 
penalties in a no-fault divorce,9 block the sale of freely owned 
property,10 allow a faith-based result in arbitration,11 or grant relief 
from an arms-length business transaction.12 
Because of its treatment of areas regulated by temporal authority, 
conflicts between sharia and domestic secular law are inevitable.  But 
should that justify the hostility sharia has received in the dozens of 
states where laws targeting its domestic use have been proposed or 
enacted in recent years?  After all, judges in a common-law system like 
ours frequently draw from external sources of authority where the 
litigants have agreed they should do so, or where such references are 
required by comity—i.e., reciprocal respect for another jurisdiction’s 
law or decisions.  Plus, applications of any such “foreign” law are 
subject to the crucial exception that no external laws should be applied 
if the public policy of the applying jurisdiction would suffer—e.g., it 
would violate a fundamental civil right.13  And regarding religious law, 
domestic courts already must strike a balance in accordance with long-
standing constitutional norms: religious practices are to be honored 
and respected, but they should neither be imposed by, nor become 
unduly entangled with, the state.14  Determining applicable law can be 
tricky, and judges do not always get it right.  But sharia is not unique 




 9  See Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93, 98 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002) 
(upholding sharia-based contract imposing monetary penalty on husband in divorce 
proceeding). 
 10  See Elsayed, supra note 1, at 940–41 (describing sharia-based right of first refusal 
of cotenant). 
 11  See Abd Alla, 680 N.W.2d at 573 (enforcing Islamic arbitration award under state 
contract law). 
 12  See Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Co., Inc., 866 A.2d 
1, 30–35 (Del. 2005) (upholding damage award for “usurpation” in business 
transaction under Saudi law). 
 13  See Eugene Volokh, Religious Law (Especially Islamic Law) in American Courts, 66 
OKLA. L. REV. 431, 435–41 (2014) (describing public-policy limits on the application 
of foreign law); see also generally Asifa Quraishi-Landes, Rumors of the Sharia Threat Are 
Greatly Exaggerated: What American Judges Really Do With Islamic Family Law in Their 
Courtrooms, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 245, 249–51 (2012) (same). 
 14  See MARK E. HANSHAW, MUSLIM AND AMERICAN? STRADDLING ISLAMIC LAW AND U.S. 
JUSTICE 191–92 (2010) (describing First Amendment prohibitions on the imposition 
of religious arbitration on the unwilling); Asma T. Uddin & Dave Pantzer, A First 
Amendment Analysis of Anti-Sharia Initiatives, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 363, 383–84 (2012) 
(describing First Amendment contemplating “individual ordering . . . according to 
one’s own religious beliefs”). 
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Within this framework, application of, or deference to, foreign 
authority has regularly included faith-based sources.  Secular courts, 
for example, enforce Beth Din contracts between observant Jews 
requiring resolution of their disputes before rabbinical tribunals;15 
“covenant” (i.e., limited divorce) marriage contracts between 
Evangelical Christians are increasingly recognized;16 and the right of 
Amish parents to raise children according to the laws of their faith has 
been endorsed by no less authority than the United States Supreme 
Court.17  The corporate decisions of each of these faiths are also 
broadly protected by the “ministerial exception” recently blessed by 
the Court in the Hosanna-Tabor case.18  But none of these other 
religions attract the antipathy faced by Muslims hoping to follow 
sharia.  As Professor Feldman has put it, “[n]o legal system has ever 
had worse press.”19 
The reasons for hostility are perhaps no mystery.  Anti-Islamic 
sentiment has increased in frequency and intensity since September 
2001, and continued unrest in the Middle East has deepened religious 
mistrust.20  Coincidentally, controversy arising from the Supreme 
Court’s recent references to foreign law in applying the federal 
constitution—a distinct matter of domestic law often confused with the 
direct imposition of another country’s law—has not cooled associated 
nationalist impulses.21 
But whatever the origins or merits of popular opposition to Islam 
(or foreign law generally), targeting sharia consideration in domestic 
courts undercuts religious liberty and is inconsistent with our standard 
approach to foreign law.  As with these other sources, religious or 
 
 15  See generally Michael J. Broyde, Jewish Law Courts in America: Lessons Offered to 
Sharia Courts by the Beth Din of America Precedent, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 287 (2012) 
(describing history and broader significance of the recognition of Jewish law courts by 
domestic courts). 
 16  Covenant marriage laws have been passed in Arkansas, Arizona, and Louisiana. 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-901 (2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-801 (2002); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 9:272 (2000). 
 17  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972). 
 18  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 
(2012) (protecting the right of religious organizations to determine their religious 
missions; there, the right to select ministers). 
 19  Noah Feldman, Why Shariah?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2008, at MM46.  
 20  See Yaser Ali, Comment, Shariah and Citizenship—How Islamophobia Is Creating a 
Second-Class Citizenry in America, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1027, 1042–49 (2012) (describing 
sharia-based Islamophobia in post-9/11 context). 
 21  See generally Eugene Volokh, Foreign Law in American Courts, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 219 
(2014) (describing controversy over the Supreme Court’s recent invocations of foreign 
law in interpreting constitutional provisions, and the resulting confusion in adoption 
of anti-sharia measures). 
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otherwise, the domestic court’s encounter with sharia does not 
constitute an application of Islamic or other foreign law in its own 
right, but the consideration of outside authority based on rules of 
decision that apply—and within due and neutral limits—under 
established conflicts-of-law doctrine.22  Singling out sharia for 
disfavored treatment, even (and perhaps particularly) where it plays 
no different role than any other foreign legal source, stigmatizes the 
Muslim community and clashes with our constitutional tradition.23 
Practices central to many faiths are at risk if, as some states have 
declared recently, courts are not only prohibited from considering 
sharia but cannot apply legal rules or enforce judgments from “any 
system” with different constitutional norms.24  Under these regimes, a 
court could reject an otherwise valid choice-of-law or arbitration term 
in a contract, a property sale, or a family arrangement because of its 
religious origins.25  More broadly, even where “anti-sharia” laws may 
have little practical effect—e.g., in the states that profess, in supposed 
contrast to Islam, that courts must act legally26—the message is 
worrisome and contrary to the robust religious pluralism to which our 
nation has historically aspired. 
To this point, the bulk of the literature addressing the domestic 
application of sharia has taken one of two opposing forms—both of 
which, purposefully or not, also tend to take a view of sharia on the 
merits and thus confuse the important distinction between religion 
and religious liberty.  On one side, those who oppose the use of sharia 
in domestic law invariably do so because, they argue, it violates human 
 
 22  See Volokh, supra note 13, at 431 (“But in many of the instances that critics see 
as improper ‘creeping Sharia,’ it is longstanding American law that calls for recognizing 
or implementing an individual’s religious principles, including Islamic principles.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 23  See Robert K. Vischer, The Dangers of Anti-Sharia Laws, 221 FIRST THINGS 26 
(2012) (describing the resulting stigmatization of Islam by domestic anti-sharia 
measures). 
 24  E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5103 (2013) (preventing application of foreign law 
where “system” from which it comes fails to accord the same fundamental rights as are 
available under the state or federal constitutions); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 20 (2013) 
(providing similarly); cf. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-8-7 (2012) (prohibiting the 
enforcement of “any religious code”). 
 25  See Matthew Schmitz, Fears of ‘Creeping Sharia’, NAT’L REV. (June 13, 2012), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/302280/fears-creeping-sharia-matthew-
schmitz (describing the broad religious liberty implications of Kansas’s anti-foreign 
law statute). 
 26  E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:6001 (2010) (preventing application of “foreign 
law” if doing so would “result in a violation of a right guaranteed” by the Louisiana or 
United States Constitution). 
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dignity and freedom.27  On the other side, those who support applying 
sharia (at least as it has been applied domestically) commonly 
emphasize aspects that would be widely accepted and minimize its 
more controversial invocations.28 
This Article proposes a third path, based on religious-liberty 
principles: regardless whether sharia is good, bad, or indifferent, our 
courts (and political culture) should approach it no differently than 
any other foreign source of law.  In so arguing, it proceeds in six parts: 
(I) this introduction; (II) a summary of approaches courts take when 
faced with external authority; (III) an overview of how Muslims 
typically try to follow sharia domestically; (IV) a discussion of the 
relevant “anti-sharia” trend (including its practical and legal aspects); 
(V) an exploration of some broader religious-liberty implications of 
the “anti-sharia” movement; and (VI) a brief conclusion.  At bottom, 
this Article seeks to provide a theoretical framework to resolve the 
controversy in a manner consistent with “the best of our traditions.”29 
One of the most rewarding aspects of our launching at Stanford 
Law School the nation’s only full-time law-school clinic dedicated to 
religious liberty has been teaching students how to reflect upon and 
articulate to an often-skeptical audience that our clients’ claims are not 
about faith or politics, but freedom.  That freedom is not absolute, but 
nor should it be restricted simply because its exercise is controversial, 
unpopular, or maybe even inconsistent with freedom itself.  After all, 
religious-liberty protections would be unnecessary were the practice at 
issue widely accepted and consistent with the dominant cultural or 
political ethos.  And so it is for Muslim Americans seeking to live in 
accordance with sharia. 
 
 27  E.g., CTR. FOR SEC. POLICY, SHARIA LAW AND AMERICAN STATE COURTS (2011), 
available at http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/ 
Shariah_in_American_Courts1.pdf (assembling cases applying sharia, which authors 
describe as threat to liberty and equality); Karen Lugo, American Family Law and Sharia-
Compliant Marriages, 13 ENGAGE 65, 66–68 (2012) (citing oppressive practices in 
questioning domestic application of sharia); Bradford J. Kelley, Bad Moon Rising: The 
Sharia Law Bans, 73 LA. L. REV. 601, 609–12 (2013) (rejecting application of sharia law 
in domestic courts, based in large part on unjust results). 
 28  See, e.g., Cyra Akila Choudhury, Shari’ah as National Security Threat?, 46 AKRON L. 
REV. 49, 83–99 (2013) (describing Islamophobia of “anti-sharia” campaign); Abed 
Awad, The True Story of Sharia in American Courts, THE NATION (June 13, 2012) 
(minimizing controversial sharia-based practices); Quraishi-Landes, supra note 13, at 
251–54 (describing pro-woman aspects of sharia); WAJAHAT ALI & MATTHEW DUSS, 
Understanding Sharia Law, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 3 (Mar. 2011), https://cdn. 
americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/03/pdf/sharia_law.pdf 
(arguing that claims against the domestic application of sharia ignore how sharia is 
actually practiced). 
 29  Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952). 
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II. CONFLICTS, COMITY, AND RELIGION 
Before exploring the domestic application of sharia, it is 
important first to review the basic parameters of the two legal contexts 
in which the issue arises: conflict-of-laws and the so-called “religious 
question” doctrine.  Conflict-of-laws, or conflicts, is a set of rules courts 
use in deciding what substantive law to apply where a case involves facts 
or circumstances arising outside the place where suit is brought.30  
Among the options are for the court to apply the laws of the place 
where it sits (despite the case’s foreign aspects), those of another 
jurisdiction, or those chosen by the parties or otherwise seemingly 
required by the action—which, for our purposes, might include faith-
based concepts.31  Use of religious authority, however, is regulated 
further by the religious-question doctrine.  That doctrine, which is 
driven by First Amendment concerns, generally requires courts to 
refrain from resolving doctrinal or other religious questions outside 
the courts’ competence that should be resolved, if at all, by religious 
authorities.32 
As one would expect, where a secular dispute arises entirely within 
the geographic area in which suit is brought and the parties have not 
sought to agree otherwise, the court applies the secular law of that 
place.33  Of course, not all domestic relationships, accidents, or 
contracts are so parochial.  A couple might marry in one state, raise 
children in another, and separate in yet another still.  A tort lawsuit 
might involve a product made, sold, or used in different states.  And 
modern business contracts often involve interstate or international 
matters. 
Courts must therefore have a process for deciding what “foreign” 
law should govern—i.e., law other than that which it uses for intra-
jurisdictional disputes.  That process, whether adopted by statute or 
judges themselves, is the courts’ conflicts rules.34  And because the 
resulting use of foreign law depends entirely upon such conflicts rules, 
the law applied to the case at hand is ultimately not the creature of any 
other place, but is in fact the enforcement of local law—in its entirety.35  
 
 30  CONFLICT OF LAWS 1 (Peter Hay et al., eds., 2010). 
 31  Id. at 144 (describing courts’ conflicts options).  
 32  See Michael A. Helfand, Litigating Religion, 93 B.U. L. REV. 493, 494 (2013) 
(describing general parameters of First Amendment limitations on court adjudication 
of religious disputes). 
 33  CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 371 (John J. Cound et al., eds., 2001). 
 34  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971) (describing 
conflicts rules). 
 35  See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (holding that 
the application of a state’s laws necessarily includes that state’s choice of law for a given 
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In other words, the application of foreign law results not from the 
authority of that law in its own right but from the local forum’s conflicts 
rule for deciding the case before the court.  In this sense, it is domestic 
law. 
Conflicts doctrine varies by jurisdiction, and the subject is not free 
from its own controversies.36  Typically, however, American courts 
apply law to cases before them as follows: (1) local law, if the dispute 
and parties are from there; or (2) the law of another state or country, 
if (a) the dispute arises (or was already ruled upon) there, (b) one or 
more parties is from there, or (c) the dispute is otherwise connected 
in a significant way to that other place.37  Alternatively, all jurisdictions 
recognize the right of parties, as a matter of personal autonomy and 
freedom of contract, to “opt out” of a forum’s laws, including its 
conflicts rules, and agree that other laws—including, perhaps, faith-
based ones—will govern.38 
Pertinently, religious norms often serve as the source of law in a 
conflicts scenario—whether directly (through privately chosen 
religious doctrine or faith-based dispute-resolution methods) or 
indirectly (through privately chosen foreign laws arising from 
countries with an established religion, or comity for the laws or pre-
existing judgments entered in such countries).39  Common direct 
examples include disputes arising from marriages formed under 
religious auspices,40 wills drafted in accordance with the decedents’ 
faith,41 or agreements to arbitrate using religious norms or referring 
 
dispute). 
 36  See Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional 
Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1968 (1997) (observing that “nothing in 
conflicts law is ever neat or tidy”). 
 37  See Thomas J. Tallarico & Patrick M. McCarthy, Conflict of Laws, 44 WAYNE L. 
REV. 597, 599–601 (1998) (describing typical conflict of laws approaches). 
 38  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).  As a leading 
treatise notes, the Restatement’s private “choice of law” rule is “followed by more 
American courts than any other provision of the Restatement.”  CONFLICT OF LAWS, 
supra note 30, at 1088 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Larry E. Ribstein, 
From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law, 37 GA. L. REV. 363, 367 (2003) 
(noting private-law clauses “are enforced in all but certain narrow categories”). 
 39  See Elsayed, supra note 1, at 945–48 (describing foreign and religious law in 
American courts). 
 40  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016 (Ill. 1990) (upholding 
pre-nuptial agreement binding couple to Orthodox Jewish principles in the event of 
divorce). 
 41  See, e.g., K. Eli Akhavan, Basic Principles of Estate Planning Within the Context of 
Jewish Law, PROBATE & PROP. 60, 60–63 (July/Aug. 2011) (describing Jewish estate 
planning). 
SONNE(DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2015  5:03 PM 
2015] DOMESTIC APPLICATIONS OF SHARIA 725 
disputes to a panel of fellow believers.42  Less direct examples include 
disputes over marital or child-custody arrangements that were already 
ruled on in some way by a court in a country with an established 
religion, or contracts to resolve disputes under the laws of such a 
country.43 
No matter the conflicts method or source of law chosen, however, 
every jurisdiction in the United States also retains a “public policy 
exception.”44  Justice Cardozo famously described this exception as 
precluding application of foreign law that “would violate some 
fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of 
morals, [or] some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal.”45  The 
exception has been defined alternatively as applying where the foreign 
law “is not only different from but also offensive to generally accepted 
values within the [applying] forum.”46  Examples of public-policy 
limitations include refusals to recognize tort claims among spouses,47 
gambling-based claims,48 covenants-not-to-compete,49 and the validity 
of certain marriages.50  Courts also will not enforce another 
jurisdiction’s criminal laws, whether rooted in religion or otherwise.51 
The mere presence of a conflict will not suffice to refuse the 
application of foreign law on public-policy grounds; naturally, a certain 
level of difference is presumed whenever a court is confronted with the 
question of what law it should use.  Rather, the public-policy exception 
 
 42  Helfand, supra note 32, at 506–08 (describing growth in faith-based 
arbitration).  
 43  See, e.g., Nat’l Grp. for Commc’ns., Ltd. & Computers v. Lucent Techs. Int’l, 331 
F.Supp. 2d 290, 292 (D.N.J. 2004) (applying Saudi sharia-based law in commercial 
dispute). 
 44  Gutierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 321 (Tex. 1979) (observing that the public-
policy exception is common to all jurisdictions). 
 45  Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111 (1918). 
 46  John Bernard Corr, Modern Choice of Law and Public Policy: The Emperor Has the 
Same Old Clothes, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 647, 649 (1985). 
 47  See, e.g., Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 473–74 (1936) (refusing on New York 
public-policy grounds to recognize inter-spousal tort claim arising from out-of-state 
accident). 
 48  See, e.g., Lane & Pyron, Inc. v. Gibbs, 266 Cal. App. 2d 61, 68 (1968) (upholding 
on California public-policy grounds trial court’s rejection of gambling-based claim 
arising out of state). 
 49  See, e.g., Application Grp. v. Hunter Grp., 61 Cal. App. 4th 881, 901 (1998) 
(refusing on California public-policy grounds to enforce out-of-state covenant not to 
compete). 
 50  See, e.g., Hesington v. Estate of Hesington, 640 S.W. 2d 824, 826–27 (Mo. 1982) 
(refusing to recognize common-law marriage arising out of state based on Missouri 
public policy). 
 51  See CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 173–74 (on non-enforcement of foreign 
criminal law). 
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applies where fundamental or substantial public interests are 
implicated.52  For example, the policy “may be embodied in a statute 
which makes one or more kinds of contracts illegal or which is 
designed to protect a person against the oppressive use of superior 
bargaining power.”53  Therefore, courts refuse to enforce foreign-law 
arrangements that violate equal protection on the basis of gender, due 
process, or other important civil rights.54  Pertinently, they likewise 
would not impose religious law on those who never chose it.55 
Although not classified as public policy, the religious-question 
doctrine imposes additional parameters on the application of foreign 
law where religion is involved.56  These arise chiefly from constitutional 
concerns.  To that end, the First Amendment prohibits courts from 
deciding the “truth or falsity” of religious beliefs, or resolving 
“controversies over religious doctrine and practice.”57  As the Supreme 
Court has observed, “religious controversies are not the proper subject 
of civil court inquiry.”58  Moreover, and as the Court clarified recently, 
the First Amendment includes within this deferential approach broad 
protection from—or, in the words of Chief Justice Roberts, “special 
solicitude” against—governmental interference with decisions of 
church governance and the selection of ministers.59 
Provided they avoid doctrinal questions or matters on which they 
must defer to religious authorities, however, courts commonly face 
cases with religious ingredients.60  Again, courts might determine the 
 
 52  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b) & cmt. g (1971). 
 53  Id. 
 54  See, e.g., Aleem v. Aleem, 947 A.2d 489, 500–01 (Md. 2008) (refusing to 
recognize husband’s disproportionate divorce rights under Islamic law based on 
gender-inequality statute); Tarikonda v. Pinjari, No. 287403, 2009 WL 930007, at *2 
(Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2009) (refusing to recognize talaq divorce on due-process 
grounds).  
 55  Sarah M. Fallon, Note, Justice for All: American Muslims, Sharia Law, and 
Maintaining Comity Within American Jurisprudence, 36 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 153, 180 
(2013) (“The First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause 
protect against the application of religious law to a party who has not agreed to such 
application.”). 
 56  See generally Helfand, supra note 32 (discussing and critiquing the so-called 
“religious question doctrine,” which limits secular courts’ ability to examine religious 
questions). 
 57  United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944); accord Presbyterian Church v. 
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969). 
 58  Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese U.S.A. & Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 
696, 713 (1976). 
 59  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 692, 
706 (2012). 
 60  See, e.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 714 (1871) (“Religious organizations 
come before us in the same attitude as other voluntary associations for benevolent or 
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validity of faith-based marriages, enforce contracts arising from such 
marriages, or interpret estate plans written according to religious 
norms.61  And although the litigants’ faith may frame such 
controversies and provide the final answer, any court consideration of 
religion is shunted in the first instance through civil marriage, 
contract, and estate law, not religious doctrine.62  Courts might 
consider faith-based concepts to determine the nature of a 
relationship—for example, whether a couple had in fact agreed to a 
prenuptial contract or what the terms of a testator’s will are—and 
perhaps even be called upon to resolve the question on conflicting 
evidence.63  Any consideration of religious matters like this, however, 
results not from religion but from secular conflicts rules—including 
their public-policy and constitutional limitations.64 
Whether in the personal or business context, courts also assess 
faith-based arbitration using largely the same standards as the 
arbitration of secular disputes.65  As long as the parties consented, the 
arbitration terms are clear, the arbitrator does not abuse her authority 
or allow the process to be tainted, and public policy is not offended, 
the agreement to arbitrate and any resulting orders will be enforced.66  
 
charitable purposes, and their rights of property, or of contract, are equally under the 
protection of the law, and the actions of their members subject to its restraints.”); Ann 
Laquer Estin, Embracing Tradition: Pluralism in American Family Law, 63 MD. L. REV. 540, 
547–48 (2004) (describing religious neutrality). 
 61  See generally Quraishi-Landes, supra note 13 (describing domestic courts’ 
treatment of Islamic family law matters); Omar T. Mohammedi, Sharia-Compliant Wills: 
Principles, Recognition, and Enforcement, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 259 (2012) (describing 
treatment of sharia-compliant wills). 
 62  See Quraishi-Landes, supra note 13, at 249–51 (observing that domestic 
recognition of sharia-based marital arrangements is rooted in secular “freedom of 
contract”); Mohammedi, supra note 61, at 260 (emphasizing “freedom of contract” in 
ensuring viability of sharia-based wills). 
 63  See Elsayed, supra note 1, at 953–54 (describing courts’ occasional need to review 
evidence on religious teachings where faith-based contracts are unclear). 
 64  Quraishi-Landes, supra note 13, at 251 (“[J]udges neither react with an 
automatic rejection of Sharia, nor do they give it wholesale deference without 
considering public policy and general constitutional principles.”); see also Volokh, 
supra note 13, at 431 (same). 
 65  See Helfand, supra note 32, at 506–08 (describing approach of courts to religious 
arbitration as substantially similar to non-religious arbitration); see also generally 
Michael C. Grossman, Note, Is This Arbitration?: Religious Tribunals, Judicial Review, and 
Due Process, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 169 (2007) (criticizing courts’ equal treatment of 
religious arbitration). 
 66  Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating 
Conflicting Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231, 1243–44 (2001) (observing that “[t]he 
mechanism to have a claim arbitrated by a religious arbitration court is the same as it 
is for standard arbitration courts” and that “[a]wards issued by religious arbitration 
courts, like those of standard arbitration tribunals, are subject to the [limited] 
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Likewise, courts enforce foreign judgments and private choices of law 
involving faith-based rules—often under the laws of another country—
provided they do not involve controversies over religious doctrine.67  
Finally, most courts try to resolve religious-property disputes under 
“neutral principles of law” (i.e., through secular sources like deeds or 
charters).68  And even where neutral principles are not used, courts try 
to defer to relevant religious authorities rather than impose their own 
views.69 
In sum, American courts have an established system for applying 
foreign law, including religious law.  They might not always reach the 
correct results, but any analysis of sharia applications must account for 
these common approaches. 
III. SHARIA AND ITS DOMESTIC APPLICATIONS 
Against the backdrop of conflicts rules and First Amendment 
limitations, and as described below, the application of sharia by 
domestic courts is a fairly standard legal enterprise.  This is not to 
suggest sharia’s critics—which, it should be noted in this context, can 
include Muslims who disagree among themselves on how others of 
their faith might understand or practice it—have no basis for concern 
over the use of Islamic law generally.  They may, they may not.  But 
when it comes to its application by domestic courts in this country, 
singling out sharia for facially disfavored treatment is not justified.  
Rather than ensuring “American law for American courts,” the recent 
pursuit of “anti-sharia” laws undercuts our standard approach to such 
matters.  As Professor Quraishi-Landes observes, “judicial treatment of 
Sharia requests is not threatening the American rule of law, it is an 
illustration of it.”70 
A brief review of sharia generally and three areas of law where it 
is most commonly applied reveal the largely unremarkable nature of 
the supposed problem and the unnecessary harm—both to the 
budding American Muslim community and to religious liberty 
generally—caused by recent “anti-sharia” efforts in many states.  These 
three areas are (1) domestic relations; (2) estate practices; and (3) 
 
statutory grounds for vacatur”). 
 67  See Quraishi-Landes, supra note 13, at 246–47 (describing court approaches to 
religious law). 
 68  See Masterson v. Diocese of Nw. Texas, 422 S.W.3d 594, 607 n.6 (Tex. 2013) 
(describing “neutral principles” approach in religious land-use cases and citing cases 
from majority of states where it has been adopted). 
 69  See id. at 602 (describing minority approach of deference to church hierarchy 
in property cases). 
 70  Quraishi-Landes, supra note 13, at 246–47.  
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alternative dispute resolution. (Again, recall that domestic courts do 
not apply the sharia-based criminal-law provisions that are the most 
controversial of all.)71 
A. Sharia Generally 
Sharia, or “the path to the watering place” in Arabic, is for 
believers a set of “commands, prohibitions, guidance and principles 
that God has addressed to mankind pertaining to their conduct in this 
world and salvation in the next.”72  As an integrated system for both 
secular and religious behavior, sharia “designate[s] the rules and 
regulations that govern the lives of Muslims.”73  More than a mere legal 
code, sharia is designed “to facilitate the ability of Muslims to know 
how to conform their lives with the Will of Allah.”74 
Sharia’s particulars are generally based on four sources: (1) the 
Koran’s text; (2) reports (“hadith”) about the sayings and life 
(“sunna”) of the Prophet Mohammed; (3) the consensus of Islamic 
scholars (“ijma”); and (4) analogies to teachings from the Koran or 
Prophet (“qiyas”) where new situations occur.75  As one would expect, 
not all Muslims subscribe to a uniform interpretation, analysis, or 
application of these four sources (collectively referred to as “fiqh”); 
indeed, sharia interpretations are diverse and dynamic.76  That said, 
American Muslims commonly turn to sharia, in whatever form or 
understanding, as a source of divine guidance in their lives—
particularly where marriage and family are concerned.77 
In secular countries like the United States, sharia applies only to 
the extent particular believers seek to follow it in their own affairs.78  
 
 71  See CONFLICT OF LAWS, supra note 30, at 173–74. 
 72  KAMALI, supra note 3, at 14. 
 73  GRIFFEL, supra note 2, at 3. 
 74  RAJ BHALA, UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAW (SHARI’A) xiii (2011). 
 75  Id. 
 76  See id. at 3–4; see also Quraishi-Landes, supra note 13, at 251–54 (describing 
intra-Muslim diversity of views about the nature and content of sharia). 
 77  See Maha Alkhateeb, Islamic Marriage Contracts: A Resource Guide for Legal 
Professionals, Advocates, Imams & Communities 18, PEACEFUL FAMILIES PROJECT (2012), 
http://www.bwjp.org/files/bwjp/articles/Islamic_Marriage_Contracts_Resource_Gu
ide_APIIDV_2012.pdf (describing common adherence to sharia in marriages among 
Muslims); see also Ali, supra note 20, at 1064 (observing “most” Muslims “would proudly 
refer to themselves as Shariah adherents,” albeit in varying degrees); Mohammedi, 
supra note 61, at 262 (noting “devout Muslims are expected” to follow sharia 
inheritance rules). 
 78  BHALA, supra note 74, at xxxi; see also Elsayed, supra note 1, at 961 (“[T]he reality 
is that Sharia law is only as relevant to a case as the parties to a contract make it—they 
must contract into Sharia (or any other religious law) for it to have any import in a 
case.”). 
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And once again, and as in other long-established and diverse religious 
traditions, “Shari’a today means different things to different 
Muslims.”79  In any event, however, where a Muslim believer considers 
it to apply, sharia is a sacred set of principles central to that individual’s 
public and private affairs in service and obedience to God—no matter 
the society or country in which they live.80  It is central to who they are 
as human beings. 
B. Marriage and Family 
Like most religions, Muslims look to sharia for detailed rules on 
marriage and family; indeed, the family is rightly described as “the 
heart” of sharia.81  And in regulating the domestic affairs of Muslims, 
sharia may foster arrangements that are unequal between men and 
women, or otherwise at odds with typical family relationships in the 
United States.82  Nonetheless, when domestic courts address family-
related disputes among American Muslims, they do not apply sharia in 
its own right but only, if at all, through state law in the first instance.83 
In marriage formation, for example, sharia might prohibit a 
Muslim from marrying someone who does not believe in God.84  And 
while a Muslim man may marry a “woman of the Book” (i.e., Jew or 
Christian), a Muslim woman may marry only a Muslim man.85  Sharia 
can also provide disparate age minimums, the negotiation of marriage 
by one’s relatives, and in some cases allow polygamy.86  But questions 
 
 79  GRIFFEL, supra note 2, at 12. 
 80  JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 4 (1982) (observing that 
sharia “is, in the last resort, the sum total of the personal privileges and duties of all 
individuals”); see also Mark L. Movsesian, Fiqh and Canons: Reflections on Islamic and 
Christian Jurisprudence, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 861, 864 (2011) (describing importance 
of religious law to contemporary Muslims). 
 81  Lugo, supra note 27, at 66. 
 82  Quraishi-Landes, supra note 13, at 247–51 (describing sharia marriage and 
divorce rules). 
 83  Estin, supra note 60, at 551 (observing that in the United States, “persons of all 
religious, cultural and ethnic backgrounds are subject to the same family law rules and 
institutions”). 
 84  See Alex B. Leeman, Note, Interfaith Marriage in Islam: An Examination of the Legal 
Theory Behind the Traditional and Reformist Positions, 84 IND. L.J. 743, 755 (2009) 
(describing religious-entry rules under traditional sharia). 
 85  See id. at 755–58. 
 86  See Yehiel S. Kaplan, A Father’s Consent to the Marriage of His Minor Daughter: 
Feminism and Multiculturalism in Jewish Law, 18 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 393, 400 
(2009) (describing marital-age rules in Muslim context); Lindsey E. Blenkhorn, Note, 
Islamic Marriage Contracts in America Courts: Interpreting Mahr Agreements as Prenuptials 
and Their Effect on Muslim Women, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 189, 197–98 (2002) (describing 
disparate ages of consent for an Islamic marriage contract based on gender, and 
observing that such contracts are often negotiated by the groom and a male bridal 
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about a marriage’s legal standing are resolved under secular, not 
religious, law—whether as a matter of public policy, constitutional 
protections for marital choice, or concern that to do otherwise might 
violate the Establishment Clause.87  A state might defer to religious 
officials to confirm certain formalities were observed.88  A state might 
also honor Islamic marriages performed overseas based on conflicts 
principles and comity, provided public policy is not offended.89  But 
sharia norms are facially irrelevant to a marriage’s domestic validity.90 
The question becomes trickier in divorce, property, and child-
custody disputes.91  Under the “talaq” doctrine, for example, sharia 
allows men to divorce their wives through a series of verbal 
declarations.92  And although sharia might allow other divorce 
 
relative); Asifa Quraishi & Najeeba Syeed-Miller, No Altars: A Survey of Islamic Family 
Law in the United States, in WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW: PERSPECTIVES ON 
REFORM, 177, 192–93 (2009) (describing polygyny in Islamic law). 
 87  See Quraishi-Landes, supra note 13, at 247–51 (observing that marriages of 
minor children are not recognized in the United States as a matter of public policy); 
Quraishi & Syeed-Miller, supra note 86, at 192–93 (describing universal prohibition of 
polygamy in domestic law, and describing marriage as a personal right that cannot be 
forfeited based on the religious identity of one’s partner); Estin, supra note 60, at 550–
51, 551 n.64 (“[P]rovision for an explicitly religious family law regime would violate 
the bar on established religion under the First Amendment.”); see also Zablocki v. 
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (observing that Fourteenth Amendment requires a 
“critical examination” where state law significantly interferes with the right to marry). 
 88  See Aghili v. Saadatnejadi, 958 S.W.2d 784, 787–88 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) 
(describing state’s marriage solemnization process in Muslim context); see also 
Quraishi & Syeed-Miller, supra note 86, at 188 (describing solemnization process 
authorized by state laws). 
 89  See Fallon, supra note 55, at 171–74 (describing both the recognition and limits 
of comity in the Islamic law context). 
 90  See Estin, supra note 60, at 557 (“[D]espite the move toward greater private 
ordering of family life, courts and legislatures continue to enforce a set of background 
norms based on constitutional values.”); see also Quraishi & Syeed-Miller, supra note 
86, at 188 (observing that marriages conducted only under religious rules are “a risky 
practice under U.S. law because, barring a finding of common law or putative 
marriage, the parties and their children have no state-enforceable legal rights upon 
each other”).  Limited exceptions to the irrelevance of sharia in the domestic 
recognition of marriages have arisen where courts are asked to recognize otherwise 
invalid marital arrangements that were valid in a foreign jurisdiction—e.g., a 
polygamous marriage or marriage between cousins—but any such recognition arises 
as a matter of comity for foreign authority, not independent validation of these 
arrangements.  See Estin, supra note 60, at 563–65 (describing balancing approach 
taken by courts to foreign marriages). 
 91  See Estin, supra note 60, at 559 (“[B]eyond the rules for celebration of 
marriages . . . substantive marriage regulations pose more difficult cultural and legal 
conflicts.”).  
 92  See RAFFIA ARSHAD, ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW 111 (2010) (providing a helpful flow 
chart on the various steps in a talaq divorce, where a husband unilaterally divorces his 
wife through a series of statements and waiting periods, subject only to financial 
support in the case of a recent birth). 
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methods—with some initiated by women—talaq is the normal form, 
and one that reflects a more traditional (and arguably chauvinistic) 
view of gender roles.93  On the other hand, sharia typically also requires 
marrying couples to first enter a “mahr” agreement, under which the 
husband pays a monetary penalty in the event of such summary 
divorce.94  Mahr contracts can thus be seen as a way to protect women 
from financial burdens and compensate them for income lost in 
marriage—though again, this is a practice reflecting a more traditional 
view of marriage.95 
Despite the religious aspects of talaq or mahr, however, American 
courts use secular standards, not religious ones, to determine in the 
first instance the reality and consequences of divorce for Muslims.96  As 
a matter of comity, our courts might recognize a talaq obtained while 
a couple lived abroad—provided its recognition would not violate an 
important public policy, like due process or the equitable treatment of 
assets.97  But that recognition would be based on domestic respect for 
the other country’s authority, not the substance of the religious norm.98  
 
 93  SCHACHT, supra note 80, at 164–65.  
 94  See Blenkhorn, supra note 86, at 201 (describing mahr agreements as 
“compensation to women for men’s unlimited, unilateral right to divorce”); see also 
SCHACHT, supra note 80, at 167 (describing mahr as a “powerful limitation” on the right 
of husbands to unilaterally divorce). 
 95  See Blenkhorn, supra note 86, at 201–02 (observing the economic-support 
purposes of a mahr agreement and its roots in a particular understanding of marital 
gender roles). 
 96  See, e.g., Shikoh v. Murff, 257 F.2d 306, 309 (2d Cir. 1958) (rejecting a talaq, and 
observing that divorce “must be secured in accordance with [state] law[ ]”); Aziz v. 
Aziz, 127 Misc. 2d 1013, 1013–14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (enforcing mahr under state 
contract law “notwithstanding that it was entered into as part of a religious ceremony,” 
and citing in support Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1983), where the court 
upheld a Jewish couple’s agreement to have a rabbinical tribunal resolve their marital 
disputes); see also Quraishi-Landes, supra note 13, at 248, 249 (“Purely religious 
divorces . . . are not recognized by state law because states claim exclusive subject 
matter jurisdiction over marriage dissolution . . . . [M]ost state judges treat a mahr 
clause as they do any other contract clause; it is enforced unless (1) it violates some 
basic rule of contract law . . . , or (2) its application would violate public policy”). 
 97  See Aleem v. Aleem, 947 A.2d 489, 501 (Md. 2008) (refusing talaq from Pakistan 
where property in husband’s name was not subject to equitable division); Tarikonda 
v. Pinjari, No. 387403, 2009 WL 930007, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2009) (refusing 
talaq from India without “basic rudiments of due process”); see also Ann Laquer Estin, 
Toward a Multicultural Family Law, 38 FAM. L.Q. 501, 511 (2004) (observing that 
American courts may recognize foreign talaq divorces as a matter of comity, provided 
they were obtained with due process); Emily Thompson & F. Soniya Yunus, Choice of 
Laws or Choice of Culture: How Western Nations Treat the Islamic Marriage Contract in 
Domestic Courts, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 361, 382 (2007) (observing similarly).  But see Chaudry 
v. Chaudry, 388 A.2d 1000, 1006 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (enforcing Pakistani 
talaq and mahr in lieu of greater relief under state spousal-support laws). 
 98  See Fallon, supra note 55, at 168–74 (framing domestic recognition of sharia-
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No such unilateral divorce would be honored for couples residing 
here.99 
Mahr contracts are the most distinctive legal feature of Islamic 
marriage in this country, even for more “progressive” Muslims.100  
Nevertheless, civil courts regularly address them under “neutral 
principles”—which include both a broad freedom of contract 
(including on a religious basis) and public-policy limits on that 
freedom, such as prohibition of contracts that encourage divorce or 
protections against the inequitable waiver of marital property.101  At 
bottom, mahr contracts are treated no differently than similar 
arrangements that limit the future rights of couples in divorce, 
whether in the secular or religious context (like the Jewish ketuba).102 
Enforcing a mahr can be problematic where, as is sometimes the 
custom, a bride’s father or other relative negotiated it.103  Similarly, 
because sharia may allow marriage by minors, a mahr’s validity may be 
suspect on that basis, too.104  These aspects can clash with Western 
 
based judgments in other countries as a matter of comity). 
 99  See Estin, supra note 97, at 511 (observing that a talaq divorce “has no secular 
legal effect” in the United States). 
 100  See Quraishi & Syeed-Miller, supra note 86, at 188 (“[M]ost Muslims in the U.S. 
seem to consider only one thing really important that would not otherwise be included 
in a standard civil marriage license: a provision regarding the wife’s bridal gift or 
dower.”). 
 101  See, e.g., Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93, 97 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002) 
(enforcing mahr under neutral principles of law as a contract between consenting 
adults); Akileh v. Elchahal, 666 So. 2d 246, 248–49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (same); 
Habibi-Fahnrich v. Fahnrich, No. 46186/93, 1995 WL 507388, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1995) (refusing to enforce mahr under statute of frauds); In re Marriage of Shaban, 
88 Cal. App. 4th 398, 404–07 (2001) (same); In re Marriage of Dajani, 204 Cal. App. 
3d 1387, 1390 (1988) (rejecting mahr as violating state policy against contracts 
encouraging divorce); In re Altayar & Muhyaddin, 139 Wash. App. 1066 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2007) (rejecting mahr as inequitable avoidance of state property distribution 
rules); see also Estin, supra note 97, at 521–22 (observing that enforcement of mahr 
contracts “turn[s] on the law of contract”). 
 102  See Comment, The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act and its Variations Throughout 
the States, 23 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAWYERS 355, 355–59 (2010) (describing 
uniform act adopted in twenty-seven states that allows for the enforcement of 
premarital agreements); Estin, supra note 60, at 570 (describing California courts’ 
similar treatment of Jewish and Islamic marital agreements); see also Odatalla, 810 A.2d 
at 97 (upholding mahr under “neutral principles” approval of ketuba in Avitzur v. 
Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1983). 
 103  See Kecia Ali, Marriage in Classical Islamic Jurisprudence: A Survey of Doctrines, in 
THE ISLAMIC MARRIAGE CONTRACT 14–15 (Quraishi & Vogel eds., 2008) (describing 
common role of guardian-representative (“wali”) in negotiating marriage contract); 
see also BHALA, supra note 74, at 872–73 (describing broad authority of wali over minor 
ward).  In some traditions, a minor girl’s representative can marry her off against her 
will.  See SCHACHT, supra note 80, at 161–62. 
 104  See Blenkhorn, supra note 86, at 198–99 (emphasizing marriage of minors in 
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norms of equality and personal autonomy, and can also undercut 
marital-property protections where the mahr is deemed a prenuptial 
agreement that waives a greater financial award available under state 
law.105  But domestic courts will not enforce mahr contracts that are 
rooted in coercion or lack of understanding.106  And although there 
are outliers, courts commonly refuse to honor agreements that would 
waive and then undervalue what a spouse might receive under secular 
rules governing the division of property in divorce.107 
Finally, regarding child custody, various schools of sharia thought 
differ.  On the whole, mothers are preferred custodians for their small 
children.108  Once adolescence is reached, however, there is in some 
circles a distinct preference for custody to originate with, or even 
transfer to, fathers, who are often understood as the chief guardian of 
a child’s education (particularly for boys).109  But no matter what sharia 
might say, domestic courts almost universally apply the secular “best 
interests of the child” test in assigning custody.110  Context is of course 
important in assessing a child’s best interests, and religious 
background and upbringing are not ignored.111  Indeed, religious 
factors can be an integral part of the analysis.112  Nevertheless, and as 
 
broad attack on the domestic enforcement of mahr agreements). 
 105  See Blenkhorn, supra note 86, at 191 (criticizing mahr agreements as depriving 
women of property without adequate representation or understanding); Lugo, supra 
note 27, at 79 (arguing that the enforcement of mahr agreements endorses an 
“institutional discrimination against women”). 
 106  Quraishi-Landes, supra note 13, at 250. 
 107  See Chelsea A. Sizemore, Comment, Enforcing Islamic Mahr Agreements: The 
American Judge’s Interpretational Dilemma, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1085, 1093 (2011) 
(citing cases and noting “discernable trend” about the enforcement of mahr contracts 
that “courts are not inclined to enforce these agreements if they are financially 
inequitable to one of the parties”).  Those opposed to domestic recognition of mahr 
contracts invariably point to the New Jersey case of Chaudry, where the court upheld a 
$1,500 mahr in lieu of a more sizeable alimony and property claim.  But the mahr was 
recognized there not in its own right but only as a matter of international comity—i.e., 
the parties were Pakistani citizens and the matter had already been fully litigated there.  
Chaudry v. Chaudry, 388 A.2d 1000, 1005–06 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978). 
 108  See ARSHAD, supra note 92, at 152–54 (describing sharia schools of thought on 
child custody). 
 109  See id. at 154–57 (describing transfer or origination of fatherly custody during 
adolescence); see also JULIE MACFARLANE, ISLAMIC DIVORCE IN NORTH AMERICA 192–93 
(2012) (describing sharia-based gender preferences in post-adolescent custody). 
 110  See Quraishi-Landes, supra note 13, at 248 (emphasizing the primacy of the “best 
interests of the child” custody test as a matter of domestic public policy).  See also Ann 
Laquer Estin, Foreign and Religious Family Law: Comity, Contract, and the Constitution, 41 
PEPP. L. REV. 1029, 1036, 1040 (2014) (same). 
 111  See Estin, supra note 60, at 593 (“American courts are prepared to recognize that 
religious and cultural factors are a legitimate part of a best interests analysis.”).  
 112  See George L. Blum, Annotation, Religion As Factor in Child Custody Cases, 124 
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Professor Quraishi-Landes has also observed, secular public policy 
“guides consideration of gendered (and patriarchal) child custody and 
guardianship rules found in Islamic family law:  they are honored only 
if they are found to be consistent with the ‘best interests of the child’ 
standard.”113 
C. Estate Planning 
An additional area where sharia commonly arises in the lives of 
American Muslims is estate planning.  “Planning for death by ensuring 
a distribution of one’s estate in accordance with Islamic Sharia law is 
obligatory upon all Muslims wishing to comply with their religious 
obligations.”114  Indeed, understanding sharia inheritance rules is often 
seen as central to understanding what it means to be a Muslim.115  As 
the Koran insists of certain distributions, “this is a law from God, and 
He is all knowing, all wise.”116  Islamic Law thus contains arguably the 
most particular and technical scheme of inheritance rules of all major 
religions.117 
Islamic inheritance rules originate from detailed provisions in the 
Koran, as well as examples from the Prophet and centuries of scholarly 
teaching.118  A common understanding of these rules allows a Muslim 
to leave up to one-third of his or her estate to an outsider but requires 
the remaining two-thirds to be distributed under a relatively strict and 
complex formula that, unlike domestic law, creates a “guaranteed 
right” to certain inheritance shares in designated family members.119  
Protected family status includes spouses, parents, and children, but 
also extends to grandparents, grandchildren, and even siblings 
 
A.L.R.5th 203, § 2[b] (2004) (summarizing courts’ considerations of religion in 
awarding child custody). 
 113  Quraishi-Landes, supra note 13, at 248 (emphasis added); see also Jennifer Ann 
Drobac, Note, For the Sake of the Children: Court Considerations of Religion in Child Custody 
Cases, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1609, 1633–41 (1998) (summarizing cases where religious 
factors were rejected based on a broad spectrum of potential harms to child). Courts 
will also refuse religious considerations where the litigating parents disagree on such 
matters.  See Estin, supra note 60, at 548. 
 114  Mohammedi, supra note 61, at 260; see also ARSHAD, supra note 92, at 187 
(quoting the Prophet as saying,”[i]t is the duty of a Muslim who has anything to 
bequeath not to let two nights pass without writing a will about it”). 
 115  See Mohammedi, supra note 61, at 264 (observing that in the Maliki school of 
jurisprudence, “knowledge of inheritance law is referred to as half the knowledge of 
religion”). 
 116  THE QUR’AN: A NEW TRANSLATION 51 (M.A.S. Abdel Haleem, ed., 2004). 
 117  BHALA, supra note 74, at 1092.  
 118  See ARSHAD, supra note 92, at 188–89 (describing origins and evolution of 
inheritance rules). 
 119  BHALA, supra note 74, at 1093–94. 
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(including half-brothers and half-sisters).120 
Like other traditional faith practices, sharia-based inheritance 
rules tend to “presuppose a patriarchal organization of the family,”121 
reflecting a view of the man as chiefly responsible for family welfare.122  
For example, shares of husbands and sons are often twice that of wives 
and daughters, respectively.123  The rules also do not typically provide 
an elective share, where the surviving spouse can choose a default 
minimum in the event the sharia amount is inadequate.124  That said, 
in response to charges that the system is sexist, its defenders often 
point to the system’s complexity, cultural context, and differences 
among Muslims as to the rules in question, as well as countervailing 
rules that may benefit women—e.g., any outstanding mahr must be 
paid as a debt before any other distribution (which would then also 
include a share to the wife based on succession).125 
An additional controversial aspect of Islamic inheritance arises 
from the understanding in some quarters that non-Muslims, including 
spouses, are disqualified from any legacy to which they might have had 
a right.126  To quote the Prophet, “a Muslim cannot be the heir of a 
disbeliever, nor can a disbeliever be the heir of a Muslim.”127  Defenders 
of a literal reading of this text stress that the rule does not typically 
forbid a decedent from granting a non-believer all or part of the one-
third portion of his or her estate left to discretion.128  Nevertheless, even 
among faithful Muslims, the “difference of religion” prohibition for 
the remainder of the estate is readily acknowledged to be difficult and 
potentially divisive.129 
 
 120  See id. at 1137–43 (describing estate succession rights of male and female heirs). 
 121  SCHACHT, supra note 80, at 170. 
 122  See BHALA, supra note 74, at 1162 (observing that inheritance rules recognize 
the man as the “bread-winner, provider, and protector”); KAMALI, supra note 3, at 273 
(observing that any male favoritism in sharia-based estate rules is based chiefly on a 
view of the man being in charge of family finances). 
 123  BHALA, supra note 74, at 1162, 1092, 1141–42, 1148–49 (describing gender-
based disparities in sharia-based estate succession rules). 
 124  Mohammedi, supra note 61, at 276–77 (describing lack of spousal election in 
Islamic wills). 
 125  See id. at 278–79 (discounting feminist critique of sharia inheritance rules as 
ignoring other pro-woman aspects of those rules and other dynamics in Muslim 
culture); see also BHALA, supra note 74, at 1162–63; ARSHAD, supra note 92, at 192–93 
(same). 
 126  See BHALA, supra note 74, at 1104, 1159 (describing prohibition on non-Muslim 
legatees).  
 127  ARSHAD, supra note 92, at 188 (quoting hadith by Sahih al Bukhari). 
 128  See id. (observing that prohibitions against non-Muslim inheritance do not apply 
to the one-third discretionary share). 
 129  See BHALA, supra note 74, at 1159 (describing negative cultural implications of 
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Notwithstanding these controversies, however, the enforceability 
of faith-based will terms is a common probate question in the case of 
decedents from other religions.130  And the approach courts take is 
largely the same as in handling similar marriage and family matters:  
private choice is enforced as a matter of personal liberty, subject only 
to narrow public-policy or constitutional limits.131  Provided the will 
does not require a court to interpret or become unduly tangled in 
religious doctrine, distributions based on religious status, like a 
“difference of religion” disqualifier, will be upheld as free religious 
exercise or under the general right to dispose of one’s property as one 
sees fit.132  As the Oregon Supreme Court urged in upholding a similar 
term in the Catholic context, “[t]he right to espouse any religious 
faith . . . carries with it the cognate right to engage as its champion in 
the proselytization of followers or converts.”133  On the other hand, 
faith-based terms will more likely be ignored where public policy would 
be violated—e.g., where a spouse would lose property relative to what 
she might be entitled under a state’s elective share.134 
D. Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Similar to arrangements found among many orthodox Jews and 
an increasing number of Christians, another common and sacred 
aspect of Muslim legal affairs is the use of faith-based arbitration or 
mediation, rather than the courts, to resolve conflicts.135  Many Muslims 
 
prohibition on non-Muslim inheritance, both externally and within the Muslim 
community). 
 130  See Mohammedi, supra note 61, at 271 (“U.S. courts have long grappled with 
conflicts . . . emerging out of the enforcement of religious clauses in wills . . .”). 
 131  See id. at 270–71 (describing “near-total flexibility and freedom” in all states for 
distributing property upon death, subject to narrow public-policy and constitutional 
limitations). 
 132  See id. at 270–81 (describing current and anticipated legal landscape for 
domestic enforcement of sharia-compliant wills); see also Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 
2d 1298, 1307 (W.D. Okla. 2010) (describing testator’s free-exercise interest in making 
faith-based bequests). 
 133  U.S. Nat’l Bank of Portland v. Snodgrass, 275 P.2d 860, 863–64 (Or. 1954). 
 134  See Mohammedi, supra note 61, at 272, 279–81 (observing that under domestic 
law, spouses may not be entirely disinherited and that, in most states, deprivation of 
an elective share will be ordered only where a spouse has affirmatively waived the 
right—though speculating that a court might ignore the elective share in cases where 
the spouse is otherwise adequately protected under the will and attendant 
circumstances); see also MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW 242–
46 (1989) (describing broad public policy in United States favoring elective share 
rights for spouses: “the surviving spouse has clearly become the favorite in 
inheritance”). 
 135  See Grossman, supra note 65, at 177–81 (describing rise in faith-based arbitration 
among Jews, Christians, and Muslims); Helfand, supra note 66, at 1243 (same); see also 
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prefer private panels—whose members are typically chosen by 
religious criteria and charged with applying sharia-based rules—as an 
alternative method of dispute resolution more consistent with their 
religious faith.136  These dispute-resolution mechanisms are 
particularly attractive to today’s American Muslims, who face unique 
challenges integrating into a distinctively Western, secular, and at 
times hostile, milieu while retaining their own culture.137  As such, faith-
based alternative dispute resolution can “play a freedom-enhancing 
role . . . by serving as part of the infrastructure that makes religious 
freedom possible.”138 
Standard faith-based arbitration involves parties agreeing that a 
dispute be resolved by co-religionists and according to religiously 
derived procedural or substantive rules.139  Examples in three contexts 
are as follows: 
 Jewish. The parties “‘hereby agree to recognize the Beth 
Din of the Rabbinical Assembly . . . or its duly appointed 
representatives, as having the authority to counsel us in 
light of Jewish tradition . . . and to impose such terms of 
compensation as it may see fit for failure to respond to its 
summons or carry out its decision.’”140 
 Christian. The parties agree to submit their claims to an 
arbitration process conducted “‘in accordance with the 
Rules of Procedure for Christian Conciliation of the Institute for 
Christian Conciliation,’” which in turn provide that “‘the 
Holy Scriptures (the Bible) shall be the supreme authority 
governing every aspect of the conciliation process.’”141 
 Muslim. A party’s claim must be “be submitted to and 
settled by arbitration before the Arbitration Court of an 
Islamic mosque located in [a chosen state] pursuant to the 
 
Uddin & Pantzer, supra note 14, at 391–92 (describing Muslim interest in faith-based 
arbitration). 
 136  See R. Seth Shippee, Note, “Blessed Are The Peacemakers”: Faith-Based Approaches to 
Dispute Resolution, 9 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 237, 245–48 (2002) (detailing sharia-based 
alternative dispute resolution). 
 137  See Michael J. Broyde, Faith-Based Private Arbitration as a Model for Preserving Rights 
and Values in a Pluralistic Society, 90 CHI. KENT. L. REV. 111, 113, 134 (2015) 
(emphasizing the community-building benefits of faith-based arbitration). 
 138  Helfand, supra note 66, at 1247. 
 139  See Grossman, supra note 65, at 182 (describing common aspects of faith-based 
arbitration). 
 140  Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 137 (N.Y. 1983). 
 141  Encore Prods., Inc. v. Promise Keepers, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1106, 1111 (D. 
Colo. 1999). 
SONNE(DO NOT DELETE) 6/22/2015  5:03 PM 
2015] DOMESTIC APPLICATIONS OF SHARIA 739 
laws of Islam.”142 
The religious dimension in each instance is unmistakable.  But 
deference to private decision-makers to resolve disputes on a basis that 
might differ from otherwise-applicable law—which, at bottom, is what 
the parties are choosing—is, for better or worse, common and 
unremarkable. Whether as a matter of religious liberty or civil law 
generally, “[a]rbitration is what the parties say it is.”143 
Indeed, courts look favorably on private agreements to 
arbitrate.144  And faith-based arrangements are no exception.145  As long 
as the parties agreed to arbitrate, the arbitrator acted impartially and 
within the scope of the agreement, and the result would not violate 
public policy, courts will enforce.146  Some raise concerns in the 
religious context; for example, that enforcing such arbitration might 
threaten free exercise or create an establishment of religion; or 
conversely, that courts’ fear of becoming mired in “religious questions” 
might cause them to defer unduly.147  But the prevailing “neutral 
principles” approach—where courts chiefly apply secular rules to 
recognize (or not) faith-based contracts—addresses most of these 
concerns.148  Pertinently, there is nothing distinct about Muslim 
arbitration on this score.  Nor should there be.149 
Among the reasons for American Muslims to choose a faith-based 
tribunal is not only a sense of religious obligation to abide by Islamic 
law, but also that these private tribunals are likely more accessible and 
sensitive to corresponding matters of language or culture that might 
differ from the Western mainstream.150  Cultural sensitivity might be 
 
 142  Abd Alla v. Mourssi, 680 N.W.2d 569, 570 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004). 
 143  Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins for New Wine: The Need to Encourage Fairness in 
Mandatory Arbitration, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1039, 1053 (1998). 
 144  Grossman, supra note 65, at 169 (“[C]ontemporary American statutory and 
decisional law on arbitration are in keeping with the unequivocal . . . acceptance of 
arbitral adjudication.”) (quoting THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION: MELTING THE LANCES AND DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS 105 (1989)). 
 145  Helfand, supra note 66, at 1245 (“[T]he policy favoring arbitration applies to 
religious and secular arbitration alike.”); see also Broyde, supra note 137, at 112 (same). 
 146  See Lee Ann Bambach, The Enforceability of Arbitration Decisions Made by Muslim 
Religious Tribunals: Examining the Beth Din Precedent, 25 J.L. & RELIGION 379, 404–05 
(2009) (describing (limited) rules for enforceable faith-based arbitration). 
 147  See id. at 389 (flagging constitutional concerns of religious arbitration). 
 148  See Charles P. Trumbull, Note, Islamic Arbitration: A New Path for Interpreting 
Islamic Legal Contracts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 609, 625 (2006) (“The neutral-principles 
doctrine has helped clarify which sorts of disputes courts may adjudicate without 
excessively entangling church and state.”). 
 149  See Bambach, supra note 146, at 389. 
 150  See id. at 404–05 (describing reasons Muslims might choose faith-based 
arbitration). 
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important, for example, where a mahr agreement would require 
payment in a non-fault divorce situation or a sharia-compliant business 
contract would prohibit the charging of interest.  In these and similar 
situations, Muslim arbitrators can render decisions in light of shared 
norms, values, and rules that secular judges might miss.151 
Sharia-based arbitration can, of course, resolve matters differently 
than had the parties gone to court.  For better or worse, agreements to 
be bound by religious arbitration do not face the First Amendment 
dilemmas that might require a court to follow secular legal principles 
or remain blind to nuances of religious doctrine.152  A talaq, for 
example, would more likely be recognized in arbitration, as would 
remedies available only under sharia, because the enforcement 
question does not concern the validity of the practice at issue but the 
authority of the body charged with deciding the dispute.  But in these 
cases of course, the parties wanted—at least ex ante—to use this method 
to resolve their dispute.153 
As with any arbitration agreement, involuntariness or duress at its 
signing will void the provision.154  Public policy can also preclude 
arbitration.  In domestic-relations cases, for example, the “‘protective 
function’ of family law” typically leads courts to apply heightened 
scrutiny.155  Similarly, arbitration will not be enforced where 
procedures are unfair or fail to afford due process.156  Some critics 
alternatively suggest that enforcing secular courts may be more 
reluctant to interfere with faith-based tribunals due to constitutional 
concerns or fail to appreciate cultural pressures that might prevail 
when faith-based agreements are entered.157  But there is nothing 
 
 151  Helfand, supra note 66, at 1268. 
 152  See Trumbull, supra note 148, at 612–13 (describing constitutional and 
evidentiary limitations on the courts’ ability to interpret and apply contracts that 
implicate Islamic law). 
 153  See Michael A. Helfand, Fighting for the Debtor’s Soul: Regulating Religious 
Commercial Conduct, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 157, 169 (2011) (“Without the consent of 
the parties, religious arbitration tribunals simply lack any enforcement power.”).  
 154  See Grossman, supra note 65, at 197 (describing duress exception to arbitration, 
though doubting its full effectiveness in the religious context, where coercion may be 
part of the faith). 
 155  Estin, supra note 60, at 599–600; see also Elsayed, supra note 1, at 975 (observing 
that the private arbitration of family law matters “require[s] closer scrutiny to ensure 
fairness”). 
 156  See Bambach, supra note 146, at 396 (describing courts’ rejection of Beth Din 
agreements where resulting arbitration procedures were “insufficient to protect a 
party’s due process rights”). 
 157  See Grossman, supra note 65, at 186–87, 197–98 (describing undue arbitrator 
deference that can result from “neutral principles” approach in religious context, and 
duress and lack of due process often inherent in religious understandings of 
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constitutionally distinct about sharia-based arbitration, nor is family or 
community pressure short of legal duress unique to the Muslim 
community.158 
In sum, the life of a practicing Muslim involves not only formal 
worship but also a host of legal practices that might differ from the 
secular approach in various areas, including marriage and family, 
estate planning, and alternative dispute resolution.  These faith-based 
practices, however, are recognized (or not) under the established 
approach of American law to religious accommodation, including its 
corresponding limiting principles, and not as a religious matter.159 
IV. SHARIA’S DOMESTIC DISCONTENTS 
Despite the limited, yet cherished, applications of sharia for 
Muslims in America, a concerted effort is afoot to limit their ability to 
so handle their own affairs.  As a constitutional enterprise, the effort 
has had mixed results; the leading sharia-specific ban (adopted in 
Oklahoma by voter referendum in 2010, with over 70-percent support) 
has since been struck down as unconstitutional, and “anti-sharia” 
advocates have needed to become more creative.160  But the march 
continues, and, in many ways, its newer, subtler manifestations—
which, on their face, tend to target only “foreign” law—are perhaps all 
the more corrosive to religious liberty.161  If, as the drafters of the 2014 
Florida statute and Alabama constitutional amendment have observed, 
sharia is a “dreadful disease” that is “invading” America and must be 
addressed for the sake of the future, the challenge is clear.162 
 
arbitration); see also Amanda M. Baker, A Higher Authority: Judicial Review of Religious 
Arbitration, 37 VT. L. REV. 157, 158 (2002) (raising similar criticisms). 
 158  See Bambach, supra note 146, at 389 (arguing there is nothing distinct about 
constitutional deference to Muslim arbitration when compared with its Jewish 
counterpart); Volokh, supra note 13, at 435 (observing that community and family 
pressures are common to Muslim, Jewish, and Christian communities, and are an 
unremarkable part of the calculus in the American freedom-of-contract system); see 
also Fallon, supra note 55, at 180 (arguing that the established approach to the Jewish 
arbitration experience should inform legal approaches to sharia-based arbitration). 
 159  See Volokh, supra note 13, at 431–32 (describing American approach to sharia 
recognition). 
 160  See Vischer, supra note 23, at 27.  
 161  See Omar Sacirbey, Anti-Shariah Movement Changes Tactics and Gains Success, 
RELIGIOUS NEWS SERVICE (May 16, 2013), www.religionnews.com/2013/05/16/anti-
shariah-movement-changes-tactics-and-gains-success/ (describing change in tactics by 
the “anti-Sharia movement” and the continued concern among civil-rights groups 
raised by “anti-foreign” law bills). 
 162  Tiffany Gabbay, Bill That Would Ban Sharia Law in Family Cases Passes Fla. Senate, 
THE BLAZE (Apr. 9, 2013), www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/04/09/bill-that-would-
ban-sharia-law-in-family-cases-passes-fla-senate/#; Tim Lockette, Legislation Would Ban 
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Whether because of the foreign nature of Islamic culture, 
confusion over the reality and effect of domestic conflicts rules (which 
largely preclude the harms feared by “sharia-in-America” opponents), 
misplaced theological disagreement, or mere prejudice, in the past five 
years legislation has been proposed in at least thirty-two states, and 
enacted so far in nine, that targets adherence to sharia as an 
illegitimate exercise of religious freedom.163  Not every provision 
mentions sharia by name; that would likely fail First Amendment 
scrutiny, as the Tenth Circuit made clear in blocking Oklahoma’s “Save 
Our State” amendment.164  But even where sharia is not specified, it is 







Islamic Law in Alabama Courts, ANNISTON STAR (Mar. 4, 2011), http://annistonstar. 
uber.matchbin.net/pages/full_story/push?article-Legislation+would+ban+Islamic+ 
law+in+Alabama+courts-%20&id=12157691 (describing earlier, sharia-specific effort 
by the sponsor of the foreign-law initiative approved by Alabama voters in November 
2014 election). 
 163  See David L. Nersessian, How Legislative Bans on Foreign and International Law 
Obstruct the Practice and Regulation of American Lawyers, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1647, 1700 app. 
(2012) (providing table of “state blocking measures on international and foreign 
law”).  The following nine state statutes target (directly or indirectly) the application 
of sharia: ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13.50 (2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-3101 (2013); 
FLA. STAT. § 61.0401 (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5103 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
9:6001 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:705(C)(1)(p) (2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-87.12 
(2013); OKLA. STAT. TIT. 12, § 20 (2012); OKLA. CONST. ART. 7, § 1(b) (2010); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 19-8-7 (2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-15-101 (2010).  Idaho passed a 
bill asking Congress to outlaw the use of foreign law by domestic courts, but did not 
do so itself.  See H.R. Con. Res. 44, 60th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Idaho 2010). Legislation 
has also been proposed in at least twenty-three other states: Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, 
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming.  See PEW RESEARCH CTR., 
FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, STATE LEGISLATION RESTRICTING USE OF FOREIGN OR 
RELIGIOUS LAW, 2010–2012, at 2–33 (2013), www.pewforum.org/files/ 2013/04/State-
legislation-restricting-foreign-or-religious-law.pdf; see also S. 265, 2013-2014 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Vt. 2014). 
 164  Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1119 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 165  See Vischer, supra note 23, at 78 (describing “clear” targeting of Islam through 
“foreign law” provisions); see also Faiza Patel & Amos Toh, The Clear Anti-Muslim Bias 
Behind Anti-Sharia Laws, WASH. POST, (Feb. 21, 2014), www.brennancenter.org/ 
analysis/clear-anti-muslim-bias-behind-anti-shariah-laws/ (same); Steve Chapman, The 
Bogus Threat From Sharia Law, TOWNHALL.COM (June 10, 2012), http://townhall. 
com/columnists/stevechapman/2012/06/10/the_bogus_threat_from_shariah_law/
page/full (same). 
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The “anti-sharia” trend can generally be divided into three 
categories: 
 Express Anti-Sharia Provisions: laws prohibiting the 
application of sharia by name; i.e., courts “shall not 
consider sharia law.”166  Oklahoma is the only state that has 
passed a sharia-specific law (there, a constitutional 
amendment by ballot initiative), but similar bills have been 
introduced in at least nine more states.167 
 Religious-Law Bans: laws prohibiting or limiting the 
application of religious law generally; i.e., courts may not 
enforce “any religious code.”168  Both South Dakota and 
Louisiana recently passed laws expressly targeting religious 
codes, and legislation has been introduced in at least four 
more states.169 
 Foreign-Law Bans: laws prohibiting or limiting the 
application of foreign law, without specific mention of 
sharia or other religious law.  The typical provision, 
inspired by the model-law project “American Law for 
American Courts,” forbids the application of “foreign or 
international” law where it would violate the state or federal 
constitution to do so.  Laws of this type have recently been 
adopted in Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, 
North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Tennessee.170  Related bills 
(or constitutional referenda) have been offered in at least 
twenty-three more states.171 
 
 166  See OKLA. CONST. ART. 7, § 1(b) (2012) (providing that, inter alia, “[t]he courts 
shall not look to the legal precepts of other nations or cultures” and “[s]pecifically, 
the courts shall not consider international law or Sharia Law”). 
 167  See PEW, supra note 163 (describing proposed legislation that makes specific 
mention of sharia, or Islamic law, having been introduced in the following nine states: 
Alabama, Arizona, Iowa, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, South Carolina, 
Tennessee, and Wyoming). 
 168  See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-8-7 (2012) (“No court, administrative agency, or 
other governmental agency may enforce any provisions of any religious code.”). 
 169  See id.; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:705(C)(1)(p) (2012).  Un-passed bills (or 
constitutional referenda) targeting “religious law” have been offered in at least four 
states: Arizona, Georgia, Iowa, and Texas.  See PEW, supra note 163. 
 170  See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13.50 (2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-3101 (2013); 
FLA. STAT. § 61.0401 (2014); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5103 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
9:6001 (2013); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-87.12 (2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 20 (2012); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 20-15-101 (2010). 
 171  Bills limiting foreign law have been introduced (but not passed) in at least 
twenty-three states: Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Vermont, West 
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Each type of legislation varies in its practical effects and 
constitutionality. But without much digging, the universal anti-Islamic 
message becomes clear.172  Indeed, all three types have their genesis in 
the “American Laws for American Courts” project begun in 2009, 
which frames “Islamic Sharia Law” as its chief target.173 
A. Sharia-Specific Bans 
Practically speaking, laws that expressly prohibit courts from 
considering sharia (category #1) would render unenforceable—or at 
least judicially suspect—many arrangements cherished by Muslim 
Americans that were described in the last section—e.g., mahr 
agreements, wills with sharia distribution rules, faith-based 
arbitration.174  For example, a will that includes a “difference in 
religion” term or incorporates the teachings of the Prophet would face 
significant obstacles in probate.175  Similarly, sharia-specific bans would 
undercut contracts to arbitrate before private panels in accordance 
with Islam.176  And marriage-based contracts that might require 
extrinsic evidence to clarify their validity or terms—a typical scenario—




Virginia, and Wyoming.  See PEW, supra note 163; see also S. 265, 2013-2014 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Vt. 2014). 
 172  See Patel & Toh, supra note 165 (observing that “the legislators leading the 
charge for foreign-law bans have not been shy about their [anti-Muslim] agenda”).  
 173  American Laws for American Courts, AM. PUB. POLICY ALLIANCE, http://public 
policyalliance.org/legislation/american-laws-for-american-courts/ (last visited Sept. 
24, 2014); see also Fallon, supra note 55, at 161–62 (describing origins of “anti-sharia” 
trend); FAIZA PATEL ET AL., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS & BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 
FOREIGN LAW BANS: LEGAL UNCERTAINTIES AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS 1 (2013), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/ForeignLawBans.p
df (observing that the foreign-law ban trend “spring[s] from a movement whose goal 
is the demonization of the Islamic faith”). 
 174  See Elsayed, supra note 1, at 953–54 (describing various practical effects of laws 
that expressly prohibit the consideration of sharia). 
 175  See, e.g., Mohammedi, supra note 61, at 275–76 (describing faith-based bequest 
terms that require at least consideration of sharia); Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F.Supp. 2d 
1298, 1303–04 (W.D. Okla. 2010) (finding reasonable a plaintiff’s concern that his 
faith-based will would not be probated under Oklahoma’s anti-sharia law).  Among 
other things, Mr. Awad’s will provided that moneys be given to charity and that his 
body be prepared and point toward Mecca, according to express rules “found in Sahih 
Bukhari” (a sacred text).  Udin & Pantzer, supra note 14, at 390. 
 176  See Uddin & Pantzer, supra note 14, at 406–17 (describing the implications of 
anti-sharia laws on the enforceability of Islamic arbitration agreements). 
 177  See Elsayed, supra note 1, at 954 (describing situations short of determining 
religious doctrine where courts would need to consider sharia in making a 
determination in the marriage setting). 
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Fortunately, states that would single out Islam for inferior 
treatment face distinct First Amendment obstacles, as the Tenth 
Circuit held in Awad v. Ziriax.178  Indeed, laws that target one religion 
over another are constitutionally suspect, and can therefore be 
justified only if they pass strict scrutiny.179  Because supporters of the 
Oklahoma law could point to no “actual problem” caused by the 
application of sharia in that state, the law failed to pass constitutional 
muster.180  And based on a “top ten” list of offending cases compiled by 
the American Laws for American Courts project, there appears no 
compelling interest elsewhere either.181  (Of the listed cases only three 
ultimately applied sharia, and in limited circumstances: two honored 
overseas custody awards but only where the foreign court had used the 
best-interest-of-the-child test, while the third refused to disturb an 
overseas divorce judgment with a (limited) mahr but because there was 
scant evidence of unfairness and the couple had left the United States 
long ago.)182 
In any event, however, the fact that the Oklahoma amendment 
passed with overwhelming public support and similar bills have been 
proposed in nine other states is alone cause for continued concern 
over manifest anti-Muslim sentiment in this context.183  As one 
commenter put it: Oklahoma’s law “is emblematic of a new kind of 
legal assault on the citizenship of American Muslims whereby they are 
publicly ostracized as ‘religious and political outsiders.’”184 
 
 178  670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 179  Id. at 1126–29 (10th Cir. 2012) (relying on Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 
(1982)). 
 180  Id. at 1130. 
 181  See AM. PUB. POLICY ALLIANCE, supra note 173 (listing ten cases where sharia law 
was, according to the authors, wrongfully applied). 
 182  See Hosain v. Malik, 671 A.2d 988, 1010–11 (Md. 1996) (enforcing overseas 
custody order based on court’s use of best-interest-of-child test); In re Marriage of 
Malak, 182 Cal.App.3d 1018, 1025–29 (1986) (same); Chaudry v. Chaudry, 388 A.2d 
1000, 1006 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (refusing to modify oversees divorce decree 
and limited support award based on inadequate showing of unfairness and lack of 
significant connection to New Jersey); see also Matthew J. Franck, A Solution in Search of 
a Problem, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (June 15, 2012), www.national review.com/ bench-
/bench-memos/303028/solution-search-problem-matthew-j-franck (criticizing a 
similar “top 20” list of “applications” of sharia for providing limited evidence of any 
problem). 
 183  See Awad v. Ziriax, 966 F.Supp. 2d 1198, 1206 (W.D. Okla. 2013) (finding “any 
reasonable voter” on Oklahoma initiative would have perceived the measure “as a 
referendum on Sharia law” and “voters would not have approved the amendment 
without the unconstitutional provisions”); see also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE NEW 
RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE 11–13 (2012) (describing rise in anti-Muslim animus 
evidenced by anti-sharia movement in Oklahoma and elsewhere). 
 184  Ali, supra note 20, at 1031. 
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B. No Religious Codes 
Regarding the second type of “anti-sharia” measure—the “no 
religious code” variant (category #2)—there is little improvement as a 
symbolic, practical, or even constitutional matter. The language of 
such legislation may not single out Islam, but there is little question it 
remains the target.  As one South Dakota leader observed, the state’s 
“no religious code” law “answer[s] the question of the Shariah law” 
without naming it.185  Likewise, the sponsor of Texas’s proposed 
“religious or cultural law” prohibition singled out sharia as the chief 
reason for the bill, claiming that “[w]e want to prevent [sharia’s 
subjugation of women] from ever happening in Texas.”186  For better 
or worse—and perhaps ironically—supporters of such laws stress 
concerns over the merits of sharia rather than religious law generally; 
indeed, they are often religiously partisan themselves.187  One need 
only look at the proposal in Georgia—which redundantly sought to 
prohibit faith-based “lashing, flogging, [and] stoning” or “forced 
marriage”—to infer these provisions are more about politics than 
law.188 
In any event, the proposition that religion should be banished 
entirely from the courts would have a significant practical impact on 
people of all faiths, not just Muslims.  Assuming a non-redundant 
interpretation of such a law—i.e., that it is not merely restating the 
religious-question abstention principle required by the First 
Amendment—then any will, contract, or foreign judgment containing, 
or even mirroring, religious law would be in doubt.189  If, as South 
Dakota’s law provides, a court may not “enforce any provisions of any 
religious code,” wills with Islamic inheritance rules, covenant-marriage 
contracts among Evangelical Christians, and Jewish Beth Din 
 
 185  Karl Huus, South Dakota Lawmakers Tackle ‘Shariah question’, NBC NEWS (Mar. 2, 
2012), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/03/02/10553424-south-dakota-law 
makers-tackle-shariah-question. 
 186  Anna M. Tinsley, Texas Lawmakers Considering Sharia Law Ban, FT. WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, Apr. 11, 2011, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/04/11/111934/texas-
lawmakers-considering-sharia.html (quoting Texas state representative Leo Berman). 
 187  See Lomi Kriel, Muslim Group Seeks to Educate Houstonians on Islamic Law, 
HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 12, 2012, at B1 (describing support of anti-sharia laws from 
conservative Christian community, sometimes as a matter of “religious freedom”). 
 188  S. Res. 926, 2011-2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2012); see also Volokh, supra 13, at 
457 (describing enforcement of domestic criminal law as an obvious and vigorous 
protections against violence undertaken in the name of religion). 
 189  See Eugene Volokh, South Dakota Ban on Court Enforcement of Religious Law, 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 7, 2012), http://volokh.com/2012/12/07/south-dakota-
ban-on-court-enforcement-of-religious-law/ (describing broad implications of a non-
redundant interpretation of South Dakota’s no-religious-law provision).  
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arbitration agreements could all be unenforceable.190 
As for the constitutionality of global religious-law prohibitions, 
they are arguably less offensive than sharia-specific measures given the 
facially neutral approach.  Nevertheless, the singling out of religion in 
such provisions—if not the anti-Islamic animus motivating their 
proposal—renders them constitutionally suspect.  As the Supreme 
Court urged in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah: “[a]t 
a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the 
law at issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or 
prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons.”191  
Moreover, to the extent anti-religious motivations are at play, “[t]he 
Free Exercise Clause protects against government hostility which is 
masked, as well as overt.”192 
Supporters might respond that laws prohibiting the judicial 
application of religious codes are necessary to prevent their undue 
recognition by the courts and the purported harms they cause—
interests presumably compelling enough to justify legislative action.193  
But the First Amendment itself forbids religious establishments—i.e., 
imposing religious law as such.194  And most of the alleged harms at 
issue—e.g., physical violence, deprivation of civil rights—are already 
addressed by well-established state criminal laws and public policy.195  
In short, these measures are either redundant or unconstitutional. 
C. Foreign-Law Limitations 
Finally, the most common and “stealthiest” attack on the use of 
sharia—particularly after the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Awad—is the 
“foreign law” statute (category #3).196  At least eight states have adopted 
such laws (Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, North 
Carolina, Oklahoma, and Tennessee), and bills have been proposed in 
 
 190  See id. (providing examples of faith-based arrangements jeopardized by 
religious-code laws). 
 191  508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993). 
 192  Id. at 534. 
 193  See, e.g., Huus, supra note 185 (describing establishment and personal-harm 
concerns driving South Dakota law); Kriel, supra note 187, at B1 (describing Texas 
effort’s entanglement focus). 
 194  See Volokh, supra note 189 (describing the redundancy of various establishment 
concerns behind no-religious-code measures). 
 195  See Grunert, supra note 5, at 725–26 (describing the redundancy of domestic 
anti-sharia measures: “For all of their gloomy predictions of Islamization in the 
American heartland, anti-sharia activists have failed to explain how or why United 
States civil and criminal law, supported by over one hundred years of Supreme Court 
precedent, would suddenly cease to apply to Muslim-Americans.”). 
 196  Vischer, supra note 23, at 27. 
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twenty-three other states, from Alaska to Vermont.197  And although 
these foreign-law statutes stand up better to constitutional muster, and 
many arguably add little to the law—e.g., by simply requiring courts to 
act constitutionally—they may be the most insidious of all to the 
interests of religious liberty.198 
States have taken two general approaches to the foreign-law 
statute.  The first, and most typical, version limits or prohibits the 
enforcement of any foreign law that would itself result in a violation of 
the state or federal constitution, laws, or public policy.199  Alabama, 
Arizona, Florida, Louisiana, North Carolina, and Tennessee have 
enacted this sort of law to varying degrees; bills have been offered in 
thirteen other states.200  The second version of the foreign-law statute 
prohibits courts from considering the laws of any foreign system that 
fails to afford rights akin to those under the state or federal 
constitution, regardless the specific law or judgment at issue in the 
case.201  Statutes of this latter type have been passed in Kansas and 
Oklahoma (after the failed referendum); bills have been offered in 
eight states.202 
Requiring courts to act constitutionally should not really have a 
direct impact on the use of sharia in domestic courts.  Because 
religious law is implicated only where its use is otherwise in accord with 
(or perhaps even required by) the constitution, foreign-law statutes 
that would set the constitution as a limit should be pointless, at least 
 
 197  See supra notes 170, 171 (citing state anti-foreign law provisions). 
 198  See Vischer, supra note 23, at 27–28 (“Even though the First Amendment has 
now forced anti-Sharia advocates to frame their proposed laws so broadly as to be 
meaningless, these initiatives should be vigorously contested by the defenders of 
religious liberty.”). 
 199  See PATEL ET AL., supra note 173, at 18 tbl. 1 (listing states with foreign-law 
measures triggered by direct violation of the state or federal constitution, laws, or 
policy). 
 200  See id.; ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13.50 (2014); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-3101 (2013); 
FLA. STAT. § 61.0401 (2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:6001 (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-
87.12 (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-15-101 (2010). 
 201  See PATEL ET AL., supra note 173, at 18 tbl. 1 (listing states with foreign-law 
measures).  See also Estin, supra note 110, at 1032 (lamenting “broad comparative 
constitutional law inquiry” required by system-based foreign law prohibitions).   
 202  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5103 (2013); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 20 (2012) (referencing 
a law enacted by the Oklahoma legislature in 2013 to replace the state’s defunct anti-
Sharia constitutional amendment).  See also Eugene Volokh, California Court: ‘The 
Probable Use of Islamic Law in a Civil Action . . . Offends California Policy,’ WASH. POST (Nov. 
4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/ 
2014/11/04/california-court-the-probable-use-of-islamic-law-in-a-civil-action-offends-
california-policy/ (criticizing California state court order refusing to recognize Iranian 
law based on systemic problems, or, as the superior court put it, “Iran is run by mullahs 
and lacks an independent judiciary and due process of law”). 
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from a legal perspective.203  As Professor Vischer has noted, “American 
courts are generally not in the business of issuing rulings that violate 
litigants’ constitutional rights.”204  Moreover, because violations of 
public policy already limit applications of foreign law, foreign-law 
statutes that include public policy as a further limiting ground should 
really be no stronger than constitutional limits; again, as a legal 
matter.205  Likewise, even in states that would prohibit the application 
of foreign law where doing so would conflict with state law, any such 
application would be driven by the state’s conflicts rules, and thus, by 
its nature, should be understood as consistent with state law—in its 
entirety—anyway.206 
Courts, however, may differ in their interpretation of 
constitutional, public-policy, or other state-law limits, causing (at a 
minimum) significant uncertainty for faith-based legal 
arrangements—not only for Muslims but all believers.  For example, 
one might interpret Arizona’s ban on the “enforcement” of foreign law 
where “doing so would violate” state or federal law as forbidding any 
result that differs from domestic law; as opposed to requiring only that 
the state’s conflicts rules operate.207  Similarly, a court might evaluate 
whether an underlying foreign judgment was obtained according to 
domestic procedural standards (beyond the state’s conflicts rules) in 
interpreting the Louisiana or North Carolina statutes, which refuse 
such judgments if a constitutional violation “results.”208  Finally, a court 
might reject an arbitration order under these laws where the panel 
 
 203  See Elsayed, supra note 1, at 965 (calling “superfluous” foreign-law statutes to the 
extent that they would “prohibit courts from basing their decisions on foreign legal 
systems that do not provide the same protections guaranteed under the U.S. 
Constitution”); Fallon, supra note 55, at 176 (“Given that by the very definition of 
comity, principles of foreign law do not override the U.S. Constitution, efforts to ban 
Sharia [on that basis] are simply unnecessary.”). 
 204  Vischer, supra note 23, at 27. 
 205  See Volokh, supra note 21, at 236 (“Existing choice of law rules contain many 
tools that ensure American courts do not apply a foreign law that is sufficiently against 
American public policy.”). 
 206  See Quraishi-Landes, supra note 13, at 246 (describing a pre-existing conflicts-
based approach to the application of religious law). 
 207  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-3101 (2013); see also Matt Anderson, The Threat to 
Interest-Free Home Financing: The Problem of State Governments’ Prohibition of Islamic-
Compliant Financing Agreements, 37 HAMLINE L. REV. 311, 334 (2014) (describing 
uncertainty caused by foreign-law statutes in the enforcement of contracted-for choice-
of-law provisions). 
 208  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:6001 (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-87.12 (2013); see also 
PATEL ET AL., supra note 173, at 32 (“[S]tate courts acting under a foreign law ban 
may . . . refus[e] enforcement when foreign proceedings deviate from specific 
procedures considered constitutionally necessary to satisfy the requirement of due 
process in the United States.”). 
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addressed religious questions in a manner contrary to the 
Establishment Clause.209  In these respects, common “foreign” 
approaches such as faith-based tribunals, contracted-for waivers of 
rights, or judgments obtained without a jury would all be at risk 
regardless whether they would otherwise be honored as a matter of 
comity.210 
In any event, the fact that this first version of the foreign-law 
statute (i.e., no violation of constitution, public policy, or other 
domestic law) is superfluous at the least, and confusing at the most, 
may be its greatest significance.  To the extent these statutes are 
unnecessary, their (often-dogged) pursuit can rightly be perceived as 
nothing more than an attempt to divide and stigmatize.211  And based 
on their common legislative history, the unspoken enemy is Muslim.212  
One need only read the recently adopted Alabama measure, which 
restricts the use of laws established “by any people, group, or culture 
different from the Constitution and laws of the United States or the State 
of Alabama,” to get the implication.213  Finally, even where the impact 
is unclear, the chilling effect on the personal affairs of those potentially 
affected is unmistakable.214  (The fact that several states exempt 
corporations from their new foreign-law rules only furthers the notion 
that they are more about degrading religious practice than protecting 
domestic legal principles).215 
 
 209  See Samir Islam, Comment, The Negative Effects of Ill-Advised Legislation: The 
Curious Case of the Evolution of Anti-Sharia Law Legislation into Anti-Foreign Law Legislation 
and the Impact on the CISG, 57 HOW. L.J. 979, 1016 (2014) (describing possible 
entanglement problems for enforcing faith-based arbitration under an anti-foreign law 
regime). 
 210  See PATEL ET AL., supra note 173, at 23 (describing the wide impacts on the lives 
of Muslims and other faiths of even narrow foreign-law statutes). 
 211  See Vischer, supra note 23, at 28 (observing that unnecessary foreign-law statutes 
“serve[ ] only to fan the flames of religious intolerance while nurturing public 
acceptance of the notion that the religious commitments of our citizens have no place 
in our courts”). 
 212  See PATEL ET AL., supra note 173, at 33–35 (describing anti-Muslim legislative 
history of foreign-law statutes: “as the history of these bans shows, anti-foreign law 
measures have been pushed, in large part, by those who openly advocate an anti-
Islamic agenda”). 
 213  ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13.50 (2014) (emphasis added). 
 214  See Islam, supra note 209, at 1015–16 (describing “chilling effects” of foreign-law 
statutes). 
 215  ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13.50(h) (2014); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:6001(g) (2013); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-15-101 (2010).  The fact that exceptions are made might also 
undercut the constitutionality of foreign-law statutes.  See Fraternal Order of Police 
Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 365–66 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying 
strict scrutiny under the First Amendment to laws that treat substantial categories of 
secular conduct more favorably than religious conduct; there, beard rules for police 
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The second version of the foreign-law statute—i.e., no application 
of laws from an out-of-sync system—is less common, but more 
significant as a practical matter.  In Kansas, for example, courts cannot 
enforce foreign laws arising from a “code or system that would not 
grant the parties affected by the ruling or decision the same 
fundamental liberties, rights and privileges granted under the United 
States and Kansas constitutions.”216  Naturally, examining the domestic 
legitimacy of an entire legal system rather than determining whether 
enforcing a particular law or judgment violates public policy breaks 
from traditional conflicts doctrine and related notions of comity.217  
And the disqualifying circumstances are broad, including most 
domestic-relations arrangements from countries that otherwise lack 
full gender equality (a common scenario), almost any faith-based 
arbitration (which would include established religious rules in conflict 
with the First Amendment), and any choice-of-law provision involving 
a jurisdiction without, say, a civil-jury trial.218 
The foreign-system approach is particularly harmful to Muslims.  
Mahr contracts, which are common among Muslim married couples, 
are often entered into in countries that neither separate church and 
state nor treat men and women equally, and would thus be rejected on 
that basis no matter their terms.219  And because foreign “systems” are 
not limited to sovereign nations, but could also include religious 
codes, any estate plan based on sharia would be suspect given the many 
differences between faith-based systems like sharia and Western 
secular law, even if the estate terms at issue are unremarkable.220  
 
officers). 
 216  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5103 (2012). 
 217  See generally Fallon, supra note 55 (describing clash between anti-sharia laws and 
comity). 
 218  See Volokh, supra note 21, at 238–42 (describing implications of the Kansas-style 
approach to foreign law on domestic relations and choices of foreign law in business 
contracts); Islam, supra note 209, at 1016 (describing impacts on faith-based 
arbitration). 
 219  See Ryan H. Boyer, Comment, “Unveiling” Kansas’s Ban on Application of Foreign 
Law, 61 KAN. L. REV. 1061, 1079 (2013) (outlining challenges to mahr enforcement 
under Kansas statute); see also Soleimani v. Soleimani, No. 11CV4668, ¶ 27 (D. Ct. 
Johnson Cnty. Kan. 2012), available at www.volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/ 
2012/09/soleimani.pdf (describing impacts of the new Kansas law: “Thus, if a 
premarital agreement in the context of [the new statute], was the product of a legal 
system which is obnoxious to equal rights based on gender, a court could not become 
a proxy to perpetuating such discrimination.”). 
 220  See generally Mohammedi, supra note 61 (describing non-Western estate 
practices that are sacred to Muslims and should be respected as a matter of freedom 
of contract).  
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Sharia-based arbitration would similarly be at risk.221  Finally, and like 
their foreign-law counterparts, the legislative history behind these 
foreign-system laws plainly reveals their target is sharia and the affairs 
of Muslims, with particularized stigma on the basis of religious belief 
the inevitable result.222 
In sum, whether prohibiting sharia or religious law outright or 
limiting the application of foreign law, the wave of recent laws on the 
subject unnecessarily disrupts the free exercise by Muslim Americans 
of their religious faith, and more. 
V. SHARIA AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
Thomas Jefferson famously observed of the removal of Christian-
specific language from an earlier draft of the 1786 Virginia Act for 
Religious Freedom (the First Amendment’s chief precursor) that the 
Act was thus “meant to comprehend, within the mantle of its 
protection, the Jew and the Gentile, the Christian and Mohammedan, 
the Hindoo and Infidel of every denomination.”223  And although the 
protection of non-Christians was not without controversy at our 
nation’s founding,224 the global concept of religious freedom as a 
universal human right, no matter the particular faith practiced—or 
not practiced, as the case may be—has since become constitutional 
dogma.225  The Supreme Court declared in 1952, accommodating 




 221  See Elsayed, supra note 1, at 967 (observing that sharia arbitration differs from 
constitutional procedures).  An examination of religious arbitration may also violate 
the Establishment Clause, by requiring the court to examine the adequacy of 
particular religious laws; or the Free Exercise Clause, by prohibiting arbitration in 
situations where secular arbitration would be allowed.  See id. at 966–68 (describing 
First Amendment implications of foreign-system scrutiny). 
 222  See Boyer, supra note 219, at 1069 (describing anti-Muslim bias in Kansas 
legislative history). 
 223  THOMAS JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1821), reprinted in 1 WRITINGS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 66–67 (A. Lipscomb et al. eds., 1903). 
 224  See DENISE A. SPELLBERG, THOMAS JEFFERSON’S QUR’AN: ISLAM AND THE FOUNDERS 
3–11 (2013) (describing conflicting views at the founding on the rights of Muslims). 
 225  See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 590 (1989) (“Perhaps in the 
early days of the Republic [the First Amendment was] understood to protect only the 
diversity within Christianity, but today [it is] recognized as guaranteeing religious 
liberty and equality to ‘the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith 
such as Islam or Judaism.’”) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52 (1985)); see 
also Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) (observing that 
the First Amendment includes the protections of all faiths). 
 226  Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).  
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Religious freedom is perhaps nowhere more important than 
where a given practice or belief is controversial or unpopular.  As 
Justice Robert Jackson poignantly emphasized for the Supreme Court 
in upholding the right of Jehovah’s Witnesses to refuse to salute the 
flag, “freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter 
much.  That would be a mere shadow of freedom.  The test of its 
substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the 
existing order.”227  Moreover, the Court has since noted, “religious 
beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible 
to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.”228  And this 
protection applies both to beliefs and actions; the latter may be subject 
to greater government regulation, of course, but never in a 
discriminatory way—barring compelling circumstances.229 
In light of these norms, sacred practices pursued by Muslim 
Americans under sharia-based religious or foreign law should be 
protected (or not) according to existing conflicts and constitutional 
rules.  They should not be singled out for disfavored treatment.  To 
the common observer of law and religion in the United States, it is not 
unusual for believers to choose a set of principles to govern their 
affairs; nor is it rare for private arbitration arrangements or foreign 
judgments to reflect religious practices.230  To target Muslims, 
therefore, is not only inconsistent with how we treat similar 
arrangements in other faiths but clashes with domestic notions of 
familial subsidiarity, freedom of contract, and religious freedom.  It 
also places Muslims, and faith-based arrangements generally, in an 
inferior position relative to analogous secular relationships—e.g., 
contracts that mention religion or other “foreign” concepts, as 
opposed to those that do not.231 
The current push to outlaw “sharia in America” poses a significant 
threat to the Muslim family, whether by refusing to enforce domestic-
relation arbitration agreements, nullifying mahr contracts, or 
dishonoring marriages and divorces first entered into in Muslim 
 
 227  W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). 
 228  Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981). 
 229  See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532–
34 (1993) (describing non-discriminatory approach to religious beliefs and actions 
under First Amendment). 
 230  See Volokh, supra note 13, at 431–32 (describing common occurrence in 
American law for faith-based estate planning, contracting, arbitration, and domestic 
relations). 
 231  See Schmitz, supra note 25, at 1 (observing that domestic anti-sharia laws 
“assault[ ] religious liberty by putting contracts with a religious motivation on an 
unequal footing with contracts that have no religious motivation”). 
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countries.232  And in striking at “the heart” of sharia (i.e., the family), 
affected states either discriminate directly against Islam or malign it as 
an alien way of life inherently subject to suspicion.233  Domestic “anti-
sharia” measures also undermine the (often predominant) religious 
interests in marriage and family life, and the corresponding balance 
with state authority in this context achieved with almost every other 
religion throughout our history.234 
Muslim Americans, and religious liberty generally, also suffer 
from the impact of “anti-sharia” measures on estate-planning practices.  
In this context, the twin freedoms of contract and testamentary 
disposition are undercut based not on the merits of the bequest but on 
religious grounds (also a common element in such deeply personal 
circumstances).235  Although courts may not resolve disputes over the 
merits or substance of religious beliefs—in this or any other 
circumstance—the fundamental ability to dispose of one’s own 
property as one sees fit should not vary based on the motivations 
behind that disposal.236  And where, as in the case of Islam, specialized 
dispositions may be a fundamental duty of the faith, the need for 
protection is clear—particularly absent an “actual problem” to the 
contrary.237 
As for faith-based dispute resolution, “anti-sharia” measures 
diminish the religious-liberty aspects of communal decision-making, 
which is important to many religions but particularly minority faiths 
that may be understandably skittish about a majority-led justice 
 
 232  See generally Abed Awad, Islamic Family Law in American Courts, in MUSLIM FAMILY 
LAW IN WESTERN COURTS 168 (E. Giunchi ed., 2014) (describing current (stable) state 
of resolving marital disputes in domestic courts and the threat to such arrangements 
posed by anti-sharia laws). 
 233  See Fallon, supra note 55, at 181 (describing corrosive effect on American 
culture bred by domestic anti-sharia movement’s stigmatization of Muslims). 
 234  See Joel A. Nichols, Multi-Tiered Marriage, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A 
MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT 11, 11–15 (Joel A. Nichols, ed. 2012) (describing domestic 
interplay between religious and state authority in domestic marriage regulation); see 
also Robert D. Baird, Traditional Values, Governmental Values, and Religious Conflict in 
Contemporary India, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 344 (1998) (“Both Hindus and Muslims 
have traditionally held that family law was part of their religion and not a secular 
matter.”). 
 235  See Volokh, supra note 13, at 435 (describing faith-based interests in estate 
planning). 
 236  See id. at 436–37 (arguing that the “strong presumption in American law” for 
the “freedom to dispose one’s property by will” should not vary based on religious 
motivations). 
 237  See Mohammedi, supra note 61, at 264 (“[E]very single practicing Muslim must 
ensure that his or her estate is distributed in a fashion dictated by Sharia law.”); Awad 
v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1130 (10th Cir. 2012) (rejecting Oklahoma’s anti-sharia law 
based on lack of “actual problem”). 
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system.238  In an “anti-sharia” regime, courts would second-guess both 
the nature and substance of faith-based arbitration, contrary to the 
global rule that private arbitration arrangements should be honored 
as a matter of freedom of contract and disturbed only where there is 
an abuse of authority or a violation of public policy.239  And where 
foreign judgments are concerned, courts would similarly unduly 
interfere with otherwise-valid rulings from competent jurisdictions, 
both in violation of our long-standing tradition of comity (on which, 
not incidentally, we rely for similar respect for our laws and judgments 
abroad) and to the particular detriment of immigrant populations.240 
To the extent problems arise in the enforcement of faith-based 
contracts or foreign law or judgments—e.g., gender discrimination, 
deprivation of civil rights, unconscionable contracts—those should of 
course be addressed.241  But they in fact are being addressed, and in 
ways that do not malign faith.242  Religious liberty does not always 
trump.243  Rather, public policy, comity, conscionability, and even the 
First Amendment itself, provide meaningful limits in the application 
of private and foreign law, religious or otherwise.244  And where there 
 
 238  See Helfand, supra note 153, at 167 (“Thus, the existence of religious arbitration 
tribunals—and the legal enforceability of their awards—significantly expands the 
scope of religious liberty enjoyed by religious legal communities as they provide an 
adjudicative forum that both embodies religious values and promotes religious 
practices.”); see also Bambach, supra note 146, at 404 (observing that Muslim tribunals 
are attractive because “they may be more aware of, and sensitive to, cultural or religious 
practices that run counter to U.S. norms”). 
 239  See Bambach, supra note 146, at 401 (describing general rules of enforceability 
for arbitration agreements, including those rooted in religion). 
 240  See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 55, at 155–57, 164–66 (describing comity implications 
of anti-sharia laws on immigrant Muslim population). 
 241  See Lugo, supra note 27, at 79 (“Adoption of Islamic practices or Sharia law to 
the result of institutional discrimination against women is in conflict with American 
laws, constitutional protections, and public policy.”); Estin, supra note 60, at 601 
(raising gender-based free-exercise and family-law concerns in the context of faith-
based contracting for domestic-relations matters). 
 242  See Volokh, supra note 21, at 236 (“Existing choice of law rules contain many 
tools that ensure American courts do not apply a foreign law that is sufficiently against 
American public policy.”). 
 243  John Witte, Jr., The Future of Muslim Family Law in Western Democracies, in SHARI’A 
IN THE WEST 279, 286 (R. Adhar & N. Aroney eds., 2010) (observing that “even though 
religious freedom is cherished” in the West, it does not always trump). 
 244  See ASIFA QURAISHI-LANDES, INST. FOR SOC. POLICY & UNDERSTANDING, SHARIA AND 
DIVERSITY: WHY SOME AMERICANS ARE MISSING THE POINT 16 (2013), 
http://www.ispu.org/pdfs/ISPU_Report_ShariaDiversity_Final_web.pdf (describing 
common-law limits on domestic application of sharia); Fallon, supra note 55, at 180 
(observing that “[t]he First Amendment’s Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses 
protect against the application of religious law to a party who has not agreed to such 
application”). 
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are intangible social pressures that lie behind faith-based or foreign 
arrangements but which fall short of disqualifying duress, these are not 
unique to Muslims and are better suited to neutral and targeted 
reforms rather than global limits on religious liberty.245 
For some, the courts’ conception of current limits on religious or 
foreign law is inadequate; “anti-sharia” advocates, for example, have 
argued public policy is too malleable a concept to be trusted.246  But 
insisting in non-specific terms, as many “anti-sharia” laws invariably do, 
that courts must apply foreign or religious law in a manner consistent 
with domestic law, hardly removes the risk of court error.247  And in any 
event, if, as domestic sharia critics have argued, Islamic law is truly a 
“dreadful disease” or a “mortal threat” to America,248 it is difficult to 
imagine any examples fitting that bill which could overcome existing 
constitutional, policy, or legal barriers to enforcement.  That activists 
can produce only a handful of cases where sharia has been applied in 
a controversial way illustrates the point.249 
Some also have argued that, unlike other faiths, Islam is different 
because, they submit, it espouses an approach that is ultimately 
inconsistent with Western democracy, or perhaps even with the 
principle of religious freedom itself.250  But no matter the theoretical 
or political merits of this argument, our domestic civil-rights regime 
has never been reserved to those who fully agree with it.  As Professor 
 
 245  See Bambach, supra note 146, at 413–14 (flagging issue of social pressure to enter 
into faith-based contracts, particularly among women in minority-faith traditions, but 
arguing such pressure is not an issue unique to Muslims and that overestimating it 
might undercut the freedom women themselves should have to practice their faith); 
see also Volokh, supra note 13, at 435 (describing pressure to conform as a common 
factor in other faith communities). 
 246  See Lugo, supra note 27, at 67 (decrying as “soft” the public-policy limit on the 
domestic use of sharia); Kelley, supra note 27, at 630 (calling existing limits on sharia 
“woefully inadequate”). 
 247  See Volokh, supra note 21, at 243 (observing that the recent wave of foreign-law 
statutes do not eliminate the risk of that courts will get domestic law wrong in applying 
them). 
 248  See Gabbay, supra note 162 (quoting Florida lawmaker describing sharia as a 
“dreadful disease”); Scott Shane, In Islamic Law, Gingrich Sees a Mortal Threat to U.S., 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2011, at A22 (quoting then-presidential candidate Newt Gingrich 
describing sharia as a “mortal threat” to the United States). 
 249  See Franck, supra note 182 (observing, sarcastically, that critics of sharia in 
America could only point to a “whopping” seven cases in thirty-five years of even 
arguable application).  
 250  See TONI JOHNSON & LAUREN VRIENS, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, ISLAM: 
GOVERNING UNDER SHARIA (2013), http://www.cfr.org/religion/islam-governing-
under-sharia/p8034 (“Whether democracy and Islam can coexist is a topic of heated 
debate.”); Kelley, supra note 27, at 628–29 (framing anti-sharia measures as protection 
against norms at odds with domestic views of liberty). 
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Volokh observes in this context, “[n]either the freedom of speech nor 
the freedom of religion is limited to people who believe in values that 
are compatible with American constitutional guarantees,” nor are such 
freedoms limited “to those who support religious freedom.”251 
To conclude otherwise risks alienating our fellow citizens and, 
some have suggested, could even threaten our stability as a nation.252  
By passing these laws, states send a message that Muslims are outsiders 
who should be met with suspicion and distrust.253  The net result is a 
mutually-reinforcing divisiveness that only increases the obstacles 
Muslims already face—particularly since September 2001—in seeking 
to assimilate and be treated as full and equal citizens.254  As Professor 
Breger has lamented, “Muslims everywhere worry (rightfully) whether 
they have a place in the American mosaic.”255  Therefore, to avoid 
further misunderstanding and intolerance, “American non-Muslims 
would be well-advised to extend the same rights to their Muslim 
counterparts that they themselves enjoy.”256 
As new faiths have come to America’s shores or sprouted up from 
its soil, mainstream society has consistently struggled to understand 
and incorporate them.  Their often-unfamiliar practices can fit 
awkwardly within existing cultural and legal frameworks.  And the 
majority, confronted by these strange and seemingly threatening 
practices, has often been quick to condemn and slow to accommodate.  
But over time, religious liberty has ultimately prevailed. Indeed, 
“America’s exceptionalism has always been its ability to transform 
itself—economically, culturally and religiously.”257  As such, broad 
respect for religious-accommodation requests “should be something of 
 
 251  Volokh, supra note 13, at 456–57. 
 252  See Samuel J. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam? The Law and Strategy of Counter-
Radicalization, 64 STAN. L. REV. 125, 173–74 (2012) (framing domestic anti-sharia 
movement in context of other counter-radicalization efforts that risk alienating 
Muslim Americans from their country). 
 253  See Schmitz, supra note 25, at 2 (“[T]he anti-sharia movement’s implication that 
all Muslims are radicals amplifies resentments and fuels hate by encouraging 
Americans to view their neighbors with suspicion and distrust.”). 
 254  See Ali, supra note 20, at 1065–67 (arguing that domestic anti-sharia movement 
is designed to make Muslims second-class citizens, either directly or throughout 
intimidation and fear-mongering). 
 255  Marshall J. Breger, International Holocaust Remembrance Day: Bringing Imams to 
Auschwitz, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 26, 2011), www.huffingtonpost.com/marshall-j-
breger/imams-at-the-death-camps_b_814447.html; see also Gregory C. Sisk & Michael 
Heise, Muslims and Religious Liberty in the Era of 9/11: Empirical Evidence from the Federal 
Courts, 98 IOWA L. REV. 231, 288 (2012) (finding anti-Muslim tendencies even within 
the federal judiciary). 
 256  Fallon, supra note 55, at 181. 
 257  Eliyahu Stern, Don’t Fear Islamic Law in America, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2011, at A21.  
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which Americans are proud, not afraid.”258 
In the colonial era, Baptists and Quakers were banished, 
imprisoned, and attacked.259  In the mid to late nineteenth century, 
Catholics and Mormons faced mob violence, the burning of churches, 
and various forms of overt discrimination.260  And in the early to mid-
twentieth century, anti-Semitism was widespread and other religious 
minorities like Jehovah’s Witnesses were derided and targeted.261 
At each of these moments in our history, however, persecution 
gave way to accommodation and respect—even if imperfect or 
delayed.262  As Professor Witte notes, “[t]he current accommodations 
made to the religious legal systems of Christians, Jews, First Peoples, 
and others in the West were not born overnight.  They came only after 
decades, even centuries of sometimes hard and cruel experience, with 
gradual adjustments and accommodations on both sides.”263  




 258  Quraishi-Landes, supra note 13, at 257. 
 259  See THOMAS D. HAMM, QUAKERS IN AMERICA 23–24 (2003) (describing Quaker 
persecution in colonial period); Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion 
Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 919, 932–33 (2004) (describing similar anti-Baptist bigotry 
during period). 
 260  See PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 201–19 (2002) 
(detailing anti-Catholic violence and persecution in the nineteenth century); 
Lawrence Wright, Lives of the Saints, NEW YORKER, Jan. 21. 2002, at 40 (recalling that 
Mormons “entered the twentieth century as the most persecuted creed in America”). 
 261  See LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, ANTISEMITISM IN AMERICA 128–49 (1994) (describing 
“high tide” of anti-Semitism during World War II); SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, JUDGING 
JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES: RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION AND THE DAWN OF THE RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION 96–152 (2000) (describing the common and relentless persecution of 
Jehovah’s Witnesses during World War II). 
 262  See PETERS, supra note 261, at 14–16 (describing pivotal role played by Jehovah’s 
Witnesses in the development of religious liberty in the twentieth century); Wright, 
supra note 260, at 40 (calling Mormonism “perhaps the country’s most robust 
religion”). 
 263  Witte, supra note 243, at 288; see also Lee Tankle, Note, The Only Thing We Have 
to Fear is Fear Itself: Islamophobia and the Recently Proposed Unconstitutional and Unnecessary 
Anti-Religion Laws, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 273, 302 (2012) (“Religious persecution 
is not a new phenomenon in America, and history suggests that the passage of time 
generally leads to acceptance.”). 
 264  The foregoing description of the developing acceptance (or not) of new faiths 
echoes one our clinic made in an amicus effort at the Supreme Court led by Stanford 
law students Paul Harold and Jessica Spencer.  See Brief of Amicus Curiae American 
Islamic Congress in Support of Petitioners, Big Sky Colony, Inc. v. Montana Dep’t of 
Labor & Indus., 134 S. Ct. 59 (2013) (No. 12-1191). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Like most matters we handle in our clinic at Stanford, the 
application of sharia in domestic law chiefly concerns the ability to 
practice one’s faith, not the merits of the practice chosen.  Political 
conservatives and liberals, believers of all stripes, and those with no 
religious beliefs at all should appreciate this crucial and unifying 
distinction—whether the religious practice involves liturgical worship, 
grooming or clothing, marriage and family, or voluntary adherence to 
sharia.  And although religious liberty is not without its limits, those 
limits should be imposed based on legitimate countervailing concerns 
and under the established, non-discriminatory structures already 
developed to address any such concerns. 
In seeking to restrict further the domestic application of sharia by 
those who strive to obey its precepts as they understand them, many 
states have, purposefully or not, committed an all-too-common error 
in the development of religious pluralism in this country.  Like those 
opposed to the practices of other faiths in earlier generations, today’s 
“anti-sharia” activists may be able to point to controversial ways in 
which sharia has been applied elsewhere or practiced as a purely 
religious matter.  But they ignore how it is in fact applied in American 
courts—i.e., in accordance with established conflicts rules and the First 
Amendment.  The hype does not match the reality. 
Whether framed in sharia, religious-law, or foreign-law terms, 
legislation restricting the religious liberty of Muslim Americans has 
been passed or proposed in almost two-thirds of the states.  And 
although it is practices sacred to many Muslims that are most at risk—
including those central to their families, communities, and identities—
all are threatened by the assault.  Something is amiss where, as here, a 
majority can restrict the religious liberty of a minority with neither 
factual nor legal support to justify their actions.  By pointing out these 
errors and reminding the majority of the universal nature of that 
liberty, the tide can, and must, turn. 
 
